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ABSTRACT 
Problem solving courts appear to achieve outcomes which are not 
common in mainstream courts. There are increasing calls for the adoption 
of more “therapeutic” and “problem solving” practices by mainstream 
judges in civil and criminal courts in a number of jurisdictions, most 
notably in the United States and Australia. Currently, a judge who sets out 
to exercise a significant therapeutic function is quite likely to be doing so 
in a specialist court or jurisdiction, outside the mainstream court system, 
and, arguably, from outside the adversarial paradigm itself. To some 
extent, his work is tolerated but marginalized. But do therapeutic and 
problem solving functions have the potential to define, rather than 
complement, the role of judicial officers? The basic question addressed in 
this Article is, therefore, whether the judicial role could evolve to be not 
just less adversarial, but fundamentally non-adversarial. In other words, 
could we see—or are we seeing—a paradigm shift not just in the 
colloquial, casual sense of the word, but in the strong, worldview 
changing sense meant by Thomas Kuhn? 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Advocates and critics of therapeutic jurisprudence—and of many other 
vectors of what is variously referred to as ―comprehensive law,‖ ―holistic 
law,‖ ―non-adversarial justice,‖ or ―post-adversarial justice‖—have long 
called for the integration and migration of their juristic techniques and 
principles from the variously described problem solving, problem-focused, 
solutions-focused, or simply ―specialist‖ courts, into mainstream courts. 
The extent to which this is possible is uncertain and poses significant 
questions of law, practice, ethics, and jurisprudence. 
If the current judicial functions of the mainstream judge are regulated 
primarily by constitutionally, legally, or ethically mandated adversarial 
principles, and if a more therapeutic role would not be, then this suggests 
the question whether a therapeutic role would be legitimate. More 
fundamentally, if adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence are—or are 
situated within—separate and competing theoretical paradigms, then, if 
we adopt the Kuhnian context, they are incompatible and the roles of 
judges within them are incommensurable. If each does not constitute, or sit 
within, a separate Kuhnian paradigm, then our basic task as researchers 
and practitioners is to work out if any elements of both are compatible. To 
determine whether this occurs, all that is required to bring therapeutic 
jurisprudence into the mainstream is some non-paradigmatic fine-tuning of 
the adversarial system or the creation of a hybrid paradigm. One could 
also assert, of course, that either therapeutic jurisprudence is fully 
commensurable with the adversarial paradigm or that the problem solving 
approach (of which therapeutic jurisprudence is a component) is not 
paradigmatic. 
In this Article, I argue that law operates within a Kuhnian paradigm, 
that we can conceive of both an adversarial paradigm and a ―post-
adversarial‖ or ―therapeutic‖ paradigm of law, and that therapeutic 
jurisprudence is conceptually sited with in this ―post-adversarial‖ or 
―therapeutic‖ paradigm. Although I do not claim that therapeutic 
  
 
 
 
 
2011] THE NATURE OF JURISTIC PARADIGMS 99 
 
 
 
 
jurisprudence itself constitutes a discrete juristic paradigm, a therapeutic 
focus most clearly characterizes this mooted ―post-adversarial paradigm.‖ 
For that reason, I use the terms ―post-adversarial paradigm‖ and 
―therapeutic paradigm‖ interchangeably. These are separate and competing 
paradigms, in the Kuhnian
1
 sense, of what I refer to as ―juristic models.‖2 
The legal systems in some common law nations
3
 are currently exhibiting 
many characteristics of a shift from an adversarial paradigm to a 
therapeutic paradigm.
4
 The shift may be gradual and may not succeed, or it 
may involve migration to an as yet undefined hybrid or interdisciplinary 
paradigm.
5
 Still, it is essential for researchers and legal practitioners to 
understand the nature of a paradigm shift, particularly when such a shift 
applies to juristic models and the functioning of the law. We need to 
consider what the implications of such a shift would entail for future 
reforms to the law, to legal institutions, legal practice, legal education, and 
to wider justice policy. A lack of such understanding will cause an overly 
reactive approach to legal practice and court reform.
6
  
I am not suggesting here that therapeutic jurisprudence is a candidate 
for a comprehensive theoretical foundation of an entire legal system. 
Rather, I am exploring whether it could constitute a core element of an 
emerging post-adversarial approach to law. It could be the basis of an 
approach that places primary emphasis on finding workable solutions to 
 
 
 1. As articulated by Kuhn in his seminal work. See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE 
OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (Univ. of Chi. Press 3d ed. 1996) (1962) [hereinafter KUHN, SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS] (being revised and expanded upon in Kuhn‘s later work and by social science 
researchers and legal theory scholars attempting to migrate the concept(s) to other disciplines). 
 2. By juristic model, I mean the theoretical framework on which the processes of civil and 
criminal litigation in courts are based. Those processes, which I suggest have a common theoretical 
basis, include at least legal and judicial reasoning, legal and judicial methodology, legal and judicial 
techniques, criminal and civil procedure, legal and judicial ethics, and legal epistemology. 
 3. These nations include, at least, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. 
 4. More precisely, the law is moving from what Kuhn refers to as a period of normal science 
into a state of crisis.  
 5. There are a number of candidate alternative paradigms or hybrid paradigms to replace the 
adversarial model. Although, for the sake of exploring whether a shift to a therapeutic paradigm is 
possible, the assumption here is that it would be one predominantly consistent with the principles of 
therapeutic jurisprudence. This is not to say that other alternatives such as the mooted ―ethic of care,‖ 
―solutions focused law,‖ or ―comprehensive law‖ would not be as likely to characterize a new 
paradigm. It could be argued that therapeutic jurisprudence is an interdisciplinary paradigm given that 
some of its key methods involve data and practices adopted from other disciplines. 
 6. If the relationship between the two models is not conceived of as one of paradigm shift, then 
one risk is that the funding and resourcing of courts to engage in less adversarial processes will be seen 
as a non-core issue. Similarly, the level of professional and academic debate in the area is likely to be 
limited to largely pragmatic issues and the jurisprudential and doctrinal basis necessary to present 
therapeutic jurisprudence as part of a viable and fundamental alternative will be missed. To some 
extent, the debate is already being hijacked by overly pragmatic concerns. 
  
 
 
 
 
100 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 4:97 
 
 
 
 
problems rather than on formal legal resolutions or adjudications achieved 
via party-controlled proceedings overseen by a non-interventionist judge. 
As such, it would characterize a juristic model, paradigmatically different 
from the status quo. A Kuhnian-type paradigm shift to a therapeutic 
juristic model
7
 would not entail the loss of adversarial principles or 
processes, or require that therapeutic jurisprudence explain and inform 
everything that happens in our legal institutions and legal relations. In fact, 
Thomas Kuhn continually emphasized that a new paradigm must retain 
virtually all of the replaced paradigm‘s ability to solve quantitative 
problems within a discipline.
8
 What the old paradigm loses, in effect, is its 
qualitative and explanatory power.
9
 Kuhnian paradigm shift is about the 
evolution of disciplines, not progress by the total rejection of the 
cumulative disciplinary matrix, which has developed over time.
10
 
Therefore, the objective of this Article is not to establish that a shift from 
an adversarial to a therapeutic paradigm would require the jettisoning of 
all, or even most, of the mechanisms of the current common law system. 
But it would perhaps require a fundamental change in the way we view the 
role of the courts in relation to a wider social and political worldview.
11
 
There is also a danger—suggested by Rottman and others—that the 
long-term fate of therapeutic jurisprudence in the courts actually depends 
on its migration from the specialist courts to the larger ―trial court 
system.‖ This risk is due in part to the reality that court administrators and 
funding providers are loathe to fragment operations, jurisdiction, and 
 
 
 7. Note that when I refer to a ―therapeutic juristic model,‖ I moot a juristic system which is 
significantly informed by the principles and practices of therapeutic jurisprudence, and in which 
adjudication simpliciter as the core function of the system is replaced by a more therapeutic function. I 
do not posit a model or paradigm in which therapeutic jurisprudence itself is either a panacea or self-
contained rationale—nor is such a self-contained rationale necessary for paradigm status. 
 8. KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 1, at 137. 
 9. Therapeutic jurisprudence is seen by many of its adherents as a lens which provides a 
different theoretical perspective on what the law, legal institutions, and legal actors ought to do.  
 10. Although the outcomes and achievements of practitioners within a discipline might be 
permanent, the theoretical positions which lead to those outcomes are not. It is only the number of 
explicable practices and methods that grow and evolve; there is no similar growth in the number of 
paradigmatic theoretical explanations for practices within the discipline. If there is a shift to a 
therapeutic paradigm, adversarial courts will still be recognized as having achieved their objectives to 
a large degree, but there is no guarantee that similar outcomes would be viewed as successful if they 
eventuated under the newer paradigm. THOMAS KUHN, THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION: PLANETARY 
ASTRONOMY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN THOUGHT 264–65 (1957) [hereinafter KUHN, 
COPERNICAN REVOLUTION] (giving a more detailed explanation of how a new conceptual paradigm 
subsumes existing phenomena and outcomes, redefining them with examples from the natural 
sciences).  
 11. Or, as described later in this Article, weltanschauung. See also KUHN, SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS, supra note 1, at 110–35. 
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resources into too many specialized divisions.
12
 Freiberg foreshadows the 
fate of what he conceived of as ―therapeutic jurisprudence courts‖ in a 
scenario where some level of paradigm change is not forthcoming: 
If the courts prove too expensive, they will eventually lose their 
privileged status and will have to compete with the next ―vogue.‖ 
They may soon, or eventually, run out of judicial officers to staff 
them. Unless there is a significant culture change in the judiciary, a 
posting in the therapeutic jurisdiction will be seen as a form of 
punishment or as a place to put those who are seen as a bit ―soft.‖ 
There can be nothing worse for such courts than having a rapid 
succession of reluctant and unsympathetic judges or magistrates.
13
   
The reality faced by a number of less adversarial courts and tribunals is 
that they are, as Freiberg fears, finding it difficult to find sufficient 
numbers of appropriately trained and committed judicial officers. This had 
led to a situation in which some problem solving or solutions-focused 
courts are expected to meet higher standards, and achieve better and faster 
outcomes, than their mainstream equivalents.
14
  
II. THE NATURE OF KUHNIAN PARADIGMS AND PARADIGM SHIFTS 
The concept of a paradigm is used often in academic writing across a 
wide range of disciplines, and with a number of meanings.
15
 In most such 
instances, what seems to be meant by a ―paradigm‖ is not just some 
colloquial concept, but a theoretical framework which forms the defining 
core (or the set of ―exemplars‖) of a discipline, in the sense postulated by 
Kuhn.
16
 A key reason for the popularity of Kuhn‘s work is that it seems to 
give some support and vocabulary to academics and researchers who are 
 
 
 12. David Rottman, Does Effective Therapeutic Jurisprudence Require Specialized Courts (and 
Do Specialized Courts Imply Specialist Judges)?, 37 CT. REV. 22, 24 (2000).  
 13. Arie Freiberg, Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Australia: Paradigm Shift or Pragmatic 
Incrementalism?, 20 LAW IN CONT. 6, 19 (2003). 
 14. See, e.g., Nigel Stobbs & Geraldine Mackenzie, Evaluating the Performance of Indigenous 
Sentencing Courts, 13(2) AUSTL. INDIGENOUS L. REV. 90 (2009) (concluding that Indigenous 
sentencing courts in a number of Australian jurisdictions are evaluated by policymakers and funding 
providers according to stricter criteria than their mainstream equivalents). 
 15.  See generally William W. Cobern & Cathleen C. Loving, Invoking Thomas Kuhn: What 
Citation Analysis Reveals about Science Education, 9 SCI. & ED. 187 (2000) (quantifying citation of 
Kuhn across disciplines, including education, law, sociology, linguistics, political science, economics, 
marketing, and psychology). 
 16. KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 1, at 10 (defining paradigms as novel 
achievements supplying the basis for future scientific practice that draw adherents away from prior 
modes of scientific inquiry and leave unresolved many problems for the new practitioners).  
  
 
 
 
 
102 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 4:97 
 
 
 
 
rebelling against tradition.
17
 For that reason, adherents to innovative or 
alternative challenges to orthodoxy often tend to talk about the need for 
paradigm shift.  
Many versions of, or references to, the paradigm phenomenon in 
academia seem to lack analytical or conceptual depth and are occasionally 
vague to the point of being colloquial. According to Kuhn, ―[a] paradigm 
is what the members of a scientific community, and they alone, share.‖18 
This means that the paradigm is discipline-specific and unique to that 
particular discipline.
19
 For example, an adversarial system of litigation, if 
it is a paradigm, is something different from any other ―adversarial 
system‖ or other system of litigation. Since a paradigm is discipline-
specific and unique, it is also exclusive of any other proposed paradigm. 
Kuhn suggested that the canonical literature, methodologies, and practices 
of a paradigm serve for a time to implicitly ―define the legitimate 
problems and methods of a research field for succeeding generations of 
practitioners.‖20 And paradigms have done this, Kuhn observes, because 
they share two essential characteristics: ―[t]heir achievement was 
sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away 
from competing modes of scientific activity. Simultaneously, it was 
sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined 
group of practitioners to resolve.‖21 
According to Kuhn, most of the so-called theoretical research related to 
a discipline is really just a process of fine-tuning the blueprint of the field. 
This fine-tuning involves puzzle solving. Kuhn deliberately avoids calling 
it problem solving because the finding of a solution is basically guaranteed 
 
 
 17. KUHN, COPERNICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 10, at 191. Kuhn‘s view is that theories are 
comprehensive models of reality which give meaning to facts or observations. A theory operates to 
retrospectively explain a system; it is not a natural outcome of the system or observations. This means 
that we would see a science, or in this case, ―the legal system,‖ as a succession of self-contained 
paradigms that operate to serve the needs of the community rather than as a series of gradually more 
accurate approximations of what the legal system ought to be in order to be closer to an ideal or truth. 
 18. THOMAS KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION 
AND CHANGE 294 (1977). 
 19. The Macquarie Dictionary gives a useful definition of ―paradigm‖ that captures the sense in 
which it is used in this article: ―A set of assumptions, concepts, values, and practices that constitutes a 
way of viewing reality for the community that shares them, especially in an intellectual discipline.‖ 
Paradigm, http://www.macquariedictionary.com.au.ezp01.library.qut.edu.au/131.181.0.0.16@ 929F 
F8 44268244/-/p/thes/article_display.html?type=title&first=1&mid=3&last=3&current=1&result=1& 
DatabaseList=dictbigmac&query=paradigm&searchType=findrank (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
 20. KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 1, at 10 (referring frequently to those who work 
in a particular science or discipline as ―practitioners,‖ a protocol which will be followed here). 
 21. Id. at 10, 10–22 (using the terms ―science‖ and ―discipline‖ interchangeably, and using the 
terms ―scientist‖ and ―practitioner‖ interchangeably, both of which are consistent with the attempt to 
apply Kuhnian concepts to disciplines other than the natural sciences). 
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within the parameters of the current paradigm.
22
 It is just a matter of 
moving the pieces around according to the existing paradigmatic method. 
A puzzle solving practitioner is not working in completely uncharted 
territory. For example, a judge sentencing a drug offender in a mainstream 
court tries to construct the appropriate penalty based on precedent and 
legislative principles. The judge is not generally expected to design a 
judicially supervised program in which lawyers, judges, and service 
providers act as a team to address and resolve the offender‘s substance 
abuse. The latter function is not a puzzle solving duty that can be informed 
by the usual principles of sentencing.
23
  
Kuhn rejects the image of the lone scientific or academic revolutionary 
who turns orthodox worldviews on their heads. Most scientists and 
practitioners of a discipline are narrowly trained experts who focus on 
solving the puzzles until too many anomalies appear. Once too many such 
anomalies appear, then the paradigm is in crisis. Only at that point will 
there be a legitimate normative discourse about the future direction of the 
field.
24
 The paradigm moves from crisis to revolution when a viable 
alternative paradigm is found to unite the revolutionary threads that have 
arisen in response to the crisis.
25
 Therefore, we do not see any demarcation 
lines where one paradigm ends and another emerges. Fuller concludes that 
―[i]n practice, this means that an intergenerational shift occurs, whereby 
new scientific recruits are presented with a history that has been rewritten 
to make the new paradigm look like the logical outgrowth of all prior 
research in the field.‖26 
Indeed, when it comes to therapeutic jurisprudence, this process is 
already visible in calls for morphing existing mainstream courts from 
adjudication to problem solving tribunals. Practitioners within a discipline 
need to see themselves as more than just appliers of a particular puzzle 
solving method. They are prepared by their educators and mentors to 
 
 
 22. KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 1, at 36–37. 
 23. During a period of normal science, a cumulative body of knowledge and precedent develops, 
but the cumulative pool is of little use to the practitioner facing novel problems which appear 
anomalous under the existing paradigm. So a mainstream judge who was expected, as his primary 
duty, to promote change in an offender, would represent an anomaly and contribute to a crisis within 
the discipline. 
 24. This is how I characterize the current relationship between adversarialism and therapeutic 
jurisprudence in this Article. The therapeutic jurisprudence literature indisputably represents an 
extensive normative discourse about the future of the legal system. 
 25. KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 1, at 84. 
 26. STEVEN FULLER, KUHN VS POPPER: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 20 
(2003).  
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contribute to the completion of the worldview assumed by their current 
paradigm. 
Kuhn held that an epistemological paradigm shift
27
 occurs when 
sufficient anomalies arise that cannot be explained by the existing 
paradigm. A shift to a therapeutic paradigm, therefore, could occur at the 
point where the adversarial paradigm is no longer able to cope with the 
number of anomalous practices occurring in the courts. There are a 
number of non-adversarial practices currently appearing in mainstream 
civil and criminal courts, but they are not widespread enough to constitute 
a paradigm shift. Instead, they may be indicative of what Kuhn referred to 
as evidence of a crisis within the discipline, which may lead to a 
revolution.
28
 A revolution within a discipline is not, according to Kuhn, a 
dispute between an obviously correct group on one side and an obviously 
mistaken group on the other.
29
 This is the case because the paradigm itself 
is in dispute. Since the paradigm provides the only method accepted by the 
discipline for resolving disagreements about the meaning of data, results, 
or methods, a quick and objective judgment about which paradigm should 
succeed is impossible.
30
  
This revolutionary period in the discipline is more akin to the pre-
paradigmatic phase in the early days of a science or discipline than to a 
period of normal science.
31
 In the pre-paradigmatic phase the 
―fundamentals are in question, there are meaningful possibilities of 
fundamental novelty, there is a lack of focus and a sense of casting about 
within the community.‖32 It could well be, however, that the genesis of the 
legal system as a fundamentally pragmatic institution implies that there 
 
 
 27. Kuhn popularized the epistemological paradigm shift as ―a scientific revolution.‖ The shift is 
epistemological because the fundamental change is about what we consider to be the core knowledge 
of the system. 
 28. See, e.g., Diana Bryant & John Faulks, The “Helping Court” Comes Full Circle: The 
Application and Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in the Family Court of Australia, 17 J. JUD. ADMIN. 
93 (2007) (describing the policies and practices supported by principles of therapeutic jurisprudence 
that have been adopted over the past thirty years by the Family Court of Australia).  
 29. KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 1, at 148–50. 
 30. For example, a disagreement about the relative effectiveness of a particular court which has a 
high clearance rate and low appeal rate for criminal matters, but which seems to have negligible effect 
on recidivism rates, or in addressing the underlying causes of individual offending in the community 
within which it operates, cannot really be objectively settled at the moment according to the position 
taken in this Article, because the adversarial paradigm is under dispute.  
 31. But in the revolutionary stage there is no returning to a pre-paradigmatic stage which 
involves some sense of starting completely afresh and redefining the whole discipline. This is 
obviously always going to be the case with something as entrenched as the juristic model which is so 
intimately linked with other major public institutions. 
 32. RUPERT READ & WES SHARROCK, KUHN: PHILOSOPHER OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 46 
(2002).  
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was no real pre-paradigmatic phase. The adversarial system was a 
practical means of adjudicating disputes long before it developed coherent 
jurisprudential underpinnings.
33
 
Revolutions within an academic discipline that lead to paradigmatic 
change are not quick, clearly defined, and conceptually neat. The analogy 
simply reminds us that the debate or conflict between advocates of a 
theoretical status quo and their revolutionary counterparts cannot be 
resolved by a neutral and authoritative adjudicator. Indeed, it may not even 
be obvious that there are distinct groups of opposed individuals. In a 
revolutionary phase, where members of the judiciary, the legal academy, 
the legal profession, and government policy makers are split as to the 
future of adversarialism as the dominant paradigm, there is nobody left to 
referee. All have a vested interest and, according to Kuhn, a paradigm shift 
is only fully recognized in a historical sense.
34
 To those operating within a 
paradigm during a period of normal science, the current paradigm will 
appear to be the culmination of all that came before it rather than as a split 
with the past. 
Kuhn asserts that, unlike a political revolution, a revolution in an 
academic discipline is not ultimately a matter of individual choice.
35
 
Although individual practitioners can and do change perspectives, a 
paradigm shift is not fundamentally driven by individuals changing 
allegiances or being convinced that the new paradigm is preferable. In 
fact, many practitioners never switch sides at all. The groundswell of 
change needed to truly shift a paradigm comes from those who are trained 
in the new paradigm and shape their careers according to it.
36
 Those who 
do drive innovation are not likely to be changing allegiances or 
worldviews; they are likely to have never been committed to the orthodox 
paradigm in the first place.  
Kuhn contends that debate will abound during a revolutionary phase, 
but that the new paradigm succeeds because those who adopt it are 
systemically influential and end up dominating the academic discourse and 
indoctrinating the new generation of practitioners with the new 
 
 
 33. See, e.g., John Hudson, Court Cases and Legal Arguments in England c.1066-1166, in 10 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY, SIXTH SERIES 91 (Royal Hist. Soc‘y ed., 2000).  
 34. KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 1, at 7. 
 35. Id. at 111–35. 
 36. Kuhn often cites Max Planck‘s observation that ―a new scientific truth does not triumph by 
convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually 
die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.‖ Id. at 150 (quoting PLANCK, infra note 
158, at 33–34).  
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paradigm.
37
 Furthermore, Kuhn was skeptical of the extent to which 
debates during a paradigm shift involved actual and direct, rational 
disagreement and not disputes involving talking over each other, arguing 
in circles, and begging the question.
38
 For example, it is hard to find 
common ground about an argument that a particular practice ought to be 
reformed on the grounds that it has anti-therapeutic consequences if the 
other party disputes the meaningfulness of the ―anti-therapeutic‖ 
descriptor. This phenomenon is illustrated by the critique of Roderick and 
Krumholz, who assert that: 
[T]herapeutic jurisprudence, as a ―school of social enquiry‖ must 
establish specific and precise conceptual and theoretical constructs 
prior to the application of its principles to ―therapeutic‖ movements 
in the criminal justice and overall legal systems. One cannot 
ascertain the benefits of problem-solving courts or therapeutic 
lawyering techniques if one has not established the validity of 
therapeutic jurisprudence as a theoretical construct.
39
 
This sense of arguing from the basis of different core constructs is 
compounded when one considers that some therapeutic jurisprudence 
scholars and practitioners retreat from the suggestion that therapeutic 
jurisprudence is somehow a ―theory‖ or that it contains ―theoretical 
constructs.‖ Similarly, in response to Krumholz and Roderick, it could be 
argued that there is no coherent or systematic attempt to ―establish specific 
and precise conceptual and theoretical constructs prior to the application of 
its principles‖ in relation to the adversarial paradigm.40 The adversarial 
system of litigation seems to have developed according to pragmatic 
imperatives rather than as the manifestation of some carefully considered 
theoretical position. Such debates, based on mutual assertions of a lack of 
precise conceptual and theoretical constructs, appear to be exactly what 
Kuhn suggests characterize the revolutionary stage that occurs during a 
paradigm shift. 
 
 
 37. This is a key theme throughout The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, and Kuhn revisits it in 
the 1969 postscript. KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 1, at 174–210. 
 38. Id. at 94.  
 39. Susan Krumholz & Dennis Roderick, Much Ado About Nothing? A Critical Examination of 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 S. NEW ENG. ROUNDTABLE SYMP. L.J. 201, 205 (2006).  
 40. Id. 
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A. Paradigms and Worldviews 
A paradigm is more than just the currently dominant set of exemplars 
underpinning a discipline—it is a reflection of a particular worldview 
within which that exemplary framework connects to other disciplines and 
other types of human experience—from which it draws its normative 
force. Given the interrelatedness and symbiotic nature of the relationship 
between the legal system and other liberal institutions of governance, there 
is little point in trying to conceive of a legal paradigm being a standalone 
phenomenon. 
Social science has enthusiastically adopted the relationship between a 
paradigm and a worldview. In the relevant literature, the nature of a 
worldview is often discussed by reference to the weltanschauung: the 
fundamental cognitive orientation of an individual or society 
encompassing natural philosophy, ―fundamental existential and normative 
postulates or themes, values, emotions, and ethics.‖41 This can be more 
simply expressed as the set of experiences, beliefs, and values that affect 
the way an individual or community perceives and responds to reality. In 
the social sciences, and in some jurisprudential research, paradigm shifts 
in a particular discipline are said to be inevitably related to shifts in how a 
community or society organizes and understands reality.  
Since multiple paradigms within a given discipline would be, by 
definition, incompatible, one must be dominant at any given time. 
According to scholars such as Handa, a dominant paradigm is usually 
recognized by reference to a number of essential characteristics.
42
 These 
might include an increasing recognition by academic and professional 
bodies and an increasing body of journal articles which assume a basic 
knowledge of the principles of the paradigm, including iconic and 
charismatic leaders and proponents who inspire conversation, conferences 
and symposiums centering on analysis and application of the paradigm. 
This has led to the penetration of the paradigm into university syllabi and 
professional admission requirements. 
The adversarial paradigm is grounded in a long-established political 
and economic liberal worldview. This worldview holds that personal 
liberty and well-being are best obtained and maintained by competition, 
 
 
 41. GARY PALMER, TOWARD A THEORY OF CULTURAL LINGUISTICS 114 (1996) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 42. M.L. Handa, Paper presented at the International Symposium on Science, Technology and 
Development (Mar. 20–25, 1986). 
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freedom to contract, and the enforcement of personal rights as the primary 
means of dispute resolution and of promoting social cohesion.  
Within this worldview, some scholars argue that legal adversarialism 
and a culture of conflict have become seen as not only endemic but as 
paradigmatic, to the extent that to question them is to attack the very core 
of modern liberal society.
43
 Karlberg articulates it in this way: 
―[A]dversarialism has become the predominant strand in contemporary 
western-liberal societies. Throughout the contemporary public sphere, 
competitive and conflictual practices have become institutionalized norms 
. . . [B]ecause of this it is often difficult for people to envision alternatives 
. . .‖44 ―[A] proper accounting should reveal that while oppositional 
strategies have reached a point of diminishing returns, non-adversarial 
strategies are emerging as the most effective methods for lasting social 
change in an age of heightened social and ecological interdependence.‖45 
This worldview manifests itself in the legal system, asserts Karlberg, due 
to the prevalence of a ―normative adversarialism‖—the assumption that 
contests are ―normal and necessary models of social organization.‖46  
Similarly, Anand argues that a liberal Weltanschauung underpins the 
adversarial legal system to such an extent that no sense can be made of it 
outside of the traditional liberalist political philosophy. He further argues 
that the assumption is that the liberal political order, with its almost 
exclusive focus on the rights and liberties of the individual as the 
benchmark for human flourishing, is the most natural for human 
societies.
47
 Because it is the most natural, it assumes an aura of 
inevitability.  
The depth of concern that some judicial critics have about the extent to 
which therapeutic jurisprudence purportedly diverges from liberal 
principles is evident in this statement from United States District Court 
Judge Morris Hoffman: 
If therapeutic jurisprudence were just a trendy idea that did not 
work, we could let it die a natural death. But it is not just trendy and 
ineffective, it is profoundly dangerous. Its very axioms depend on 
 
 
 43. See generally MICHAEL KARLBERG, BEYOND THE CULTURE OF CONTEST: FROM 
ADVERSARIALISM TO MUTUALISM IN AN AGE OF INTERDEPENDENCE (2004) (analyzing the 
relationship between legal adversarialism and laissez-faire liberal worldviews).  
 44. Id. at xvi. 
 45. Id. at 183–84 (emphasis added). 
 46. Id. at 36. 
 47. Rakesh Anand, Legal Ethics, Jurisprudence, and The Cultural Study of The Lawyer, 81 
TEMPLE L. REV. 737, 759 (2008).  
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the rejection of fundamental constitutional principles that have 
protected us for 200 years. Those constitutional principles, based on 
our founders‘ profound mistrust of government, and including the 
commands that judges must be fiercely independent, and that the 
three branches of government remain scrupulously separate, are 
being jettisoned for what we are led to believe is an entirely new 
approach to punishment.
48
 
The strength of Judge Hoffman‘s rebuke is evidence, perhaps, of the 
perceived threat to the liberal worldview. Does therapeutic jurisprudence 
really advocate the jettisoning of these constitutional principles? 
Anand points out that a liberal worldview is contingent rather than 
inevitable and that the sort of social and political framework for legal 
thought developed by the social contractarian scholars in early 
jurisprudence, such as Rawls, is far less compelling now than in their day: 
A particular Weltanschauung speaks to a specific understanding 
about the nature of man, the nature of the world. . . . As the term 
itself implies, and as is perhaps immediately evident, a particular 
worldview is both historically and culturally contingent in 
character. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [L]iberalism begins with a belief in the primacy of the 
individual and in the goodness and inevitability of change. It is only 
within the context of this Weltanschauung that one can really take 
hold of liberalism‘s various arguments and claims. For example 
[liberal legal and political philosophy] . . . is intelligible only if one 
assumes the liberal commitment to the individual as a truly 
autonomous subject and an accompanying political theoretic 
idealism.
49
 
Kuhn alludes to the role of ideology in shaping scientific paradigms by 
considering that when a practitioner of a particular discipline begins to 
practice pursuant to a new paradigm, he must learn to see a new gestalt. 
Some of his current practices will seem incommensurable with his prior 
 
 
 48. Morris Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial 
Collectivism: The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2063, 
2071–72 (2002).  
 49. Anand, supra note 47, at 754–55 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). As will be discussed 
below, the most trenchant liberalist criticism of therapeutic jurisprudence tends to come from members 
of the U.S. judiciary who take quite conservative views of the constitutional limits of the judicial role. 
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practices despite the fact that the world ―outside of the sense data‖ has not 
changed.
50
 
There is no doubt that the common law judicial system is mired in 
liberal ideology. There has always been a desire among social scientists to 
portray and define their fields as mature disciplines akin to the natural 
sciences. It is common to see them characterized as being currently 
involved in some sort of paradigm shifting phase where there is a struggle 
between whatever theoretical forces are currently published in that 
discipline‘s journals.51 In many instances, these competing theoretical 
forces are ideologically driven. The problem with ideologically driven 
theory in the social sciences and their associated professional disciplines is 
that the ideologies—according to Kuhn—claim to represent not just 
orthodoxy, but also truth.
52
 For that reason, their methodologies, models, 
and techniques are based on an assumption of validity: It is only the results 
and data which may be suspect. According to Kuhn, science involves 
methods, models, and conjectures, which are always tentative.  
The upshot of this analysis is that in a discipline (such as law) based on 
ideology, those who suggest or advocate for a paradigm shift may become 
politically powerful but are condemned to be rationally and instrumentally 
impotent. Without a shift in ideology, paradigms cannot shift.
53
  
B. Paradigm Shift 
Kuhn states that all paradigms are faced with anomalies, but that these 
are usually dealt with as acceptable levels of error or just marginalized, 
rejected out of hand, or ignored.
54
 But the significance of anomalies varies 
 
 
 50. KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 1, at 111–12. 
 51. Both Kuhn and Popper would classify the social science disciplines as being in the pre-
science stages. 
 52. This criticism if often leveled at both the practice of law and jurisprudence. Law operates 
within a fairly precisely defined frame of reference and the traditional, adversarial lawyer will 
typically first determine whether the law is actually relevant to a client‘s problem, then determine what 
meaning the law assigns to the client‘s situation. See WILLIAM CHAMBLISS & ROBERT SEIDMAN, LAW, 
ORDER AND POWER 3 (1971) (―[T]he prescriptions of the American Constitution, the common law, 
and the statutes are descriptions of the real world . . . . The central myth . . . is that the normative 
structures of the written law represent the actual operation of the legal order.‖) (crystallizing the early 
sociological view of the law and jurisprudence of the time by asserting that jurists assume).  
 53. There is no doubt that there is a clear distinction between an ideological focus of the law as 
due process and individual rights, on one hand, and with the wellbeing of litigants and the resolution of 
problems and healing of relationships, on the other. Therapeutic jurisprudence advocates are often at 
pains to suggest that ―rights trump therapy‖ where there is a clear conflict. If true, this assertion seems 
to be more of an attempt to assuage the concerns of the legal majority rather than an attempt to attain 
theoretical legitimacy. 
 54. KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 1, at 62. 
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between practitioners within a discipline. It is unclear whether the majority 
of mainstream judges and jurists treat therapeutic courts and problem 
solving courts as anomalies that are outside the ―real‖ court system or as 
mistaken applications of policy, in effect as acceptable levels of error. 
That would allow at least some of these courts to exist without being 
perceived as an unacceptable ideological indulgence or as a threat to the 
liberal, adversarial paradigm.  
It could be that the continuation of an adversarial paradigm requires no 
particular awareness of any alternative. The acceptance and promotion of a 
paradigm at an individual level does not require that the individual be 
well-versed in the underlying orthodoxy of the paradigm. In fact, the 
relationship between paradigms and worldviews invites either a non-
critical meta-perspective or acceptance of the paradigm as a default 
position. It would not be surprising to hear judges or lawyers declare that 
they do not operate within any particular theoretical paradigm or from any 
specific worldview. As Northrop explains: 
To be sure, there are lawyers, judges and even law professors who 
tell us that they have no legal philosophy. In law, as in other things, 
we shall find that the only difference between a person ―without a 
philosophy‖ and someone with a philosophy is that the latter knows 
what his philosophy is, and is, therefore, more able to make clear 
and justify the premises that are implicit in his statement of the facts 
of his experience and his judgment about those facts.
55
 
Lawyers and judges educated without reference to any overt theoretical 
perspective may react skeptically to theoretical discussion in general and 
make the invalid assumption that the practice of law is a purely pragmatic 
affair.
56
  
Students become scientists or practitioners when they are socialized by 
the academy into accepting four characteristics of the current paradigm. 
These characteristics are: 
(1) A set of shared symbolic generalizations; 
(2) A common model of reality; 
 
 
 55. FILMER NORTHROP, THE COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL EXPERIENCE 6 (1959). 
 56. It is worth noting that, although the profession of lawyer in the English common law system 
is over 500 years old, it was not until the end of the 1800s that legal education became available as 
university level study. See Ralph Michael Stein, The Path of Legal Education from Edward I to 
Langdell: A History of Insular Reaction, 57 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 429 (1981) (tracing the history of the 
legal profession from 1292 forward). Prior to that, it was undertaken pursuant to an apprenticeship or 
indenturing scheme, which continues to some extent today with the articled clerk process.  
  
 
 
 
 
112 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 4:97 
 
 
 
 
(3) Shared values as to standards and legitimate procedures; and 
(4) Shared exemplars in the form of concrete problem solutions 
typical of the approach of the relevant scientific/academic 
community.
57
 
When a new paradigm is established, the practitioners act as though the 
new worldview is reality, an attitude bordering on dogmatism. It is in this 
context that the period of normal science, involving mostly puzzle solving, 
takes place. Kuhn acknowledged that the pursuit of this normal science 
might inhibit some doubt and originality from the work of the typical 
practitioner, but that this freed them up to dispense with questions of 
definition and philosophical assumptions and focus on puzzle solving. 
This is likely the environment in which many lawyers and judges prefer to 
work. They may accept that particular laws are tentative, but prefer to 
assume that the theoretical adversarial framework is inviolate. When a 
paradigm is truly entrenched, it is resistant to fads and transitory radical 
perspectives that could derail it. As observed earlier, competing paradigms 
are incommensurable—meaning that we cannot comprehend a new 
paradigm by application of the terminology and the theoretical framework 
of the old paradigm because, in some sense, when paradigms change, the 
world changes with them.  
To paraphrase and apply Kuhn‘s strongest position, advocates for 
competing juristic paradigms could not fully comprehend the other‘s 
perspective because they are observing elements of a literally different 
legal and social world. Kuhn would assert three supporting hypotheses for 
this conclusion: 
(1) Proponents of competing juristic paradigms will often disagree 
about the list of problems that any candidate for paradigm must 
resolve.
58
 
(2) The vocabulary and problem solving methods that an existing 
paradigm and a new contender utilize may have some similar terms 
and elements, but within the new paradigm, old terms, concepts, 
and experiments fall into new relationships with each other. They 
form a new conceptual web.
59
 
 
 
 57. KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 1, at 168–73. See generally id. at 174–210.  
 58. Id. at 148. 
 59. Id. at 149. 
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(3) The advocates of different juristic paradigms practice their 
trades in different worlds because of their legal and academic 
training and prior experience as legal practitioners.
60
 
This position is sometimes criticized as being radically relativistic, that it 
would mean that we cannot make a rational choice between competing 
paradigms if there is no common descriptive or theoretical basis by which 
to compare them.  
Few proponents of any post-adversarial or therapeutic practice would 
accept that they cannot understand the adversarial perspective and vice-
versa. In the postscript to the Third
 
edition of The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, Kuhn rebuts this criticism. He points out that, regardless of 
the content of a disciplinary paradigm, practitioners within other fields, 
intelligent readers, or academics in general ought to be able to recognize 
both the observable data that is claimed to underpin the principles of the 
paradigm and to assess its logical structure according to some meta-
paradigm.
61
 In that sense, there is some process or set of holistic 
benchmarks external to individual paradigms by which they can be 
validated or invalidated in terms of their claims to be a paradigm. We 
need not be limited to the claim that any particular paradigm is right or 
wrong, according to criteria unique to that paradigm or any other.  
So, even if we were to go so far as to say that adversarialism and 
therapeutic jurisprudence have different and incompatible languages and 
theoretical frameworks, assessments could still be made by people outside 
of either paradigm about their relative strengths. This seems to be a 
reasonable position if we accept the nature of the relationship between a 
disciplinary paradigm and a wider worldview. And that is the position that 
seems to have gained general acceptance in the post-Kuhnian literature. 
For instance, Meynell explains:  
To understand a paradigm which is a rival to the one held by 
oneself is to apprehend how it accounts for a certain amount of 
observable evidence; not to accept a paradigm which one 
understands is to believe that there is other evidence which tells 
against it, that this evidence supports another paradigm, and that 
this other paradigm explains at least a high proportion of the 
observable evidence explained by the first.
62
 
 
 
 60. Id. at 150. 
 61. Id. at 199. 
 62. Hugo Meynell, Science, the Truth, and Thomas Kuhn, 84 MIND 79, 85 (1975) (emphasis 
added).  
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If we accept Meynell‘s analysis, it is not possible for practitioners within 
each competing paradigm to engage in a true comparative discourse 
because the principles they have learned have been acquired by the use of 
exemplars, rather than by the use of suitably analytical definitions. This 
gap cannot be closed by using some common or neutral language, 
although each ought to be able to at least realize that the other has the 
status of a paradigm. That is not to say that debate or discussion between 
advocates is useless or a non sequitur, but that a shift between the 
paradigms will not occur as a result of the content of such debate.  
III. CAN JURISTIC MODELS/LEGAL SYSTEMS BE PARADIGMS IN THE 
KUHNIAN SENSE? 
In order to determine whether adversarialism and therapeutic 
jurisprudence are competing paradigms, we need to determine whether 
each is, in fact, a paradigm and, if so, what each is paradigmatic of.
63
 
Before deciding whether each may count as a paradigm, this section of the 
Article posits that we can conceive of a structure that will be referred to as 
a ―juristic model,‖ which lends itself to paradigmatic status. 
As a precursor to considering whether we can conceive of these 
concepts as forming discrete paradigms, we would need to delineate with 
some clarity what is meant by concepts such as ―the law,‖ ―the legal 
system,‖ ―the justice system,‖ and other general descriptions of those 
institutions to which researchers and practitioners suggest that therapeutic 
jurisprudence principles might apply in a wider sense. There is a pervasive 
element of vagueness in the way these concepts are dealt with and 
articulated in the literature which is perhaps reflective of the allegations of 
vagueness and indeterminacy sometimes leveled at the therapeutic 
jurisprudence movement itself.  
For example, Freiberg conceives of therapeutic jurisprudence as 
applying to entities variously described as ―the wider judicial and 
correctional system,‖ ―the criminal justice system,‖ ―court practices,‖ 
―traditional institutions of criminal justice,‖ ―court system,‖ ―the courts,‖ 
 
 
 63. Remember that, for the purposes of this Article, I am suggesting that for the sake of a 
Kuhnian analysis we grant that it is possible to conceive of therapeutic jurisprudence as a discrete 
juristic model, and hence as a paradigm on which to base a wider legal system. Few scholars would 
adopt this position, but we can also conceive of a therapeutic paradigm which, although intimately 
informed by therapeutic jurisprudence principles, is much broader in scope. Delineating and precisely 
articulating this broader paradigm is beyond the scope of this Article and, as observed earlier, is most 
recently referred to as ―post-adversarial‖ or ―trans-adversarial.‖ For the sake of the analysis in this 
Article, either conception will do. 
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―the general court structure,‖ ―broader judicial enterprise,‖ and ―larger 
trial court systems.‖64 Without attempting much analysis of the nature of a 
paradigm or what adversarialism is actually a paradigm of, Freiberg 
asserts that: 
[R]ecent changes to court practices manifested in drug courts, 
domestic violence courts, mental health courts and Koorie courts 
can be generalised to the wider judicial and correctional system 
through an understanding of the key features of problem-oriented 
courts and the theory of therapeutic jurisprudence. It argues further 
that therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice have in 
common a recognition of the importance of factors such as trust, 
procedural fairness, emotional intelligence and relational interaction 
which, if applied more broadly, can provide a constructive 
alternative to the flawed adversarial paradigm which presently 
dominates the criminal justice system.
65
 
This sort of representation of the relationship between therapeutic 
jurisprudence, restorative justice, and other vectors of what Daicoff refers 
to as the ―Comprehensive Law Movement‖66 on the one hand, and 
adversarialism on the other, is relatively common in the literature.
67
 It 
contains three assumptions that need to be addressed. First, that 
adversarialism constitutes a paradigm. Second, that this adversarial 
paradigm is flawed. Third, that therapeutic jurisprudence
68
 is an alternative 
(and arguably superior
69
) paradigm. 
The process of positing, unpacking, and challenging these assumptions 
in the context of a more rigorous Kuhnian process should provide some 
useful insights. It is important to keep in mind that to conceive of 
something as a paradigm does not entail an assertion that it is a complete 
 
 
 64. See generally Freiberg, supra note 13, at 6–7, 18–20. 
 65. Id. at 7. A few years later, Freiberg seems to have broadened his scope somewhat by 
suggesting the emergence of a ―nonadversarial paradigm.‖ See generally Arie Freiberg, Non-
Adversarial Approaches to Criminal Justice, 16 J. JUD. ADMIN. 205 (2007).  
 66. Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession: The “Comprehensive Law Movement,” 6 PEPP. 
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 1 (2006) 
 67. See also Susan Daicoff, Growing Pains: The Integration vs. Specialization Question for 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Other Comprehensive Law Approaches, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 551, 
551–53 (2008); Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical Framework, 8 
J.L. & MED. 328, 329 (2001); David Wexler, Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y & L. 220, 220–21 (1995).  
 68. Freiberg obviously conceives of therapeutic jurisprudence in this statement as part of a wider 
and more holistic approach to ―law,‖ and this issue is dealt with in more detail below. 
 69. This Article considers therapeutic jurisprudence as an incommensurable, not superior, 
therapeutic paradigm. 
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system of theory or practice. A shift in paradigm entails a shift in the core 
focus and values of a discipline, which generates new exemplars for 
testing new theories and practices within a discipline. Much, and even the 
majority, of what is done in the replaced paradigm may be retained. It is 
important to note this in order to avoid the error that therapeutic 
jurisprudence is not some sort of cult, panacea, or substitute for rigorous 
analysis of facts and law, or an end in itself.
70
 Perhaps a paradigm shift 
could even be characterized by a process as simple and broad as the law 
being fundamentally concerned with either refereeing a dispute between 
parties to decide a winner based on accepted procedural rules or being 
fundamentally concerned with seeing itself as a social force potentially 
enhancing or inhibiting therapeutic outcomes. To accept the latter as a 
fundamental focus would not entail losing all the adversarial qualities of 
the former, but it would entail a therapeutic filter applied to all legal 
processes a priori.
71
 
There is no doubting the broad application of therapeutic principles 
across the spectrum of legal fields and practices. It is virtually de rigueur 
in contemporary therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship to note that what 
was once an approach to the reform of mental health law and practice has 
broadened into many other areas of law and to list a whole host of those 
areas. In an early paper on the scope of therapeutic jurisprudence, Wexler 
comments on this potential for expansion when he asks: 
Once one starts approaching legal areas with the use of the 
therapeutic jurisprudence lens, who can tell what one will find? If 
certain legal arrangements or procedures seem to lead to high stress, 
anger, feuding behavior, even violence between different persons, 
parties, neighbors, riparian land owners, and so forth, those 
arrangements and procedures may indeed become ripe for 
therapeutic jurisprudence inquiry.
72
 
In the subsequent fifteen years since the publication of that paper, there 
has indeed been a very significant spread of therapeutic jurisprudence 
 
 
 70. Ian Freckleton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price 
and Risk of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 576 (2008).  
 71. Wexler allows that therapeutic jurisprudence is not new in that it provides a therapeutic lens 
with which to examine existing and proposed laws, procedures, and roles. He claims that what does 
seem new about it is that it ―brings together and situates under one conceptual umbrella areas that 
previously seemed disparate, many of which were developed in isolation . . . . Therapeutic 
jurisprudence itself, then, provides a lens and a new scope of scholarly inquiry.‖ Wexler, supra note 
67, at 236.  
 72. Id. at 228. 
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principles and practices into both specialist and mainstream courts and 
legal practices. But Wexler goes further than this, noting that until that 
time the bulk of therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship had been micro- 
rather than macro-analytical. He sees it as a problem that so much 
therapeutic jurisprudence writing and research is ―centrist‖: it seeks to 
reform the law rule-by-rule and procedure-by-procedure rather than to take 
the transformative approach championed by the ―outsider‖ movements in 
jurisprudence. Wexler considers this a potential weakness that much social 
science research and scholarship limits itself to micro-level 
recommendations and criticisms of the legal system. He notes that there 
has been no real attempt to construct a ―Therapeutic State,‖ but argues that 
a macro-analytic therapeutic jurisprudence is needed and is emerging.
73
  
If we conceive of both adversarialism and the purported therapeutic 
alternative as Kuhnian paradigms—which are paradigmatic of a 
contemporary ―juristic model‖—we may avoid some of the vagueness 
which has hampered previous analyses with an unclear picture of what 
theoretical perspectives and assumptions would need to change in order 
for therapeutic jurisprudence to obtain significant mainstream migration 
and credibility.
74
 The dynamics and indicators of a paradigm in shift are 
clearly explained and illustrated by Kuhn and later contributors to the 
literature. The basic conceptual claim to explore, therefore, is that we 
currently have a juristic model that is paradigmatically adversarial and this 
model may be shifting to one that is paradigmatically therapeutic. 
Furthermore, according to the Kuhnian perspective, this claim is 
evidenced by the failure of adversarialism to solve persistent and 
recalcitrant juristic problems, which can in fact be solved by therapeutic 
practices. The recidivism of drug-addicted offenders is a problem for 
which adversarial courts have perennially failed to find an answer, for 
example, whereas drug courts—as therapeutic, nonadversarial fora—are to 
 
 
 73. According to Wexler, micro-analytical therapeutic jurisprudence is not limited to work on an 
individual case, client, or problem. He asserts that it is more akin to a law reform process in which the 
practitioner or researcher attempts to affect all future similar issues or instances of the rule or 
procedure. In an earlier paper, Wexler had argued that therapeutic jurisprudence reflects changing 
conceptions of the law and legal scholarship and also made some comments about the relationship 
between therapeutic jurisprudence, the social sciences, and the discipline of law. David Wexler, 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Conceptions of Legal Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 17 
(1993). His view is that therapeutic jurisprudence raises questions which produce answers which are 
both empirical and normative, but the proper task of the legal scholar is not to generate data but to use 
data in framing recommendations and then to perhaps ―suggest important and relevant lines of inquiry 
to social scientists.‖ Id. at 19. 
 74. This is not to suggest, of course, that a fully worked theoretical framework for the paradigm 
needs to be articulated in order to ―sell‖ the paradigm, but that a generation of jurists who are 
immersed in the paradigm will need to develop and flesh out such a framework. 
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some extent solving this problem. The persistence of seemingly intractable 
problems for the adversarial system is countered by a concurrent rise in the 
effectiveness of therapeutic innovations to resolve some of these 
problems.
75
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence is usually described as an interdisciplinary 
attempt to convince the legal profession that law is a social phenomenon 
which inevitably and significantly influences the health of many of those 
who come into contact with it.
76
 Therapeutic jurisprudence indicates that 
we should strive to reform our legal institutions, rules, and roles to ensure 
that this influence creates as little harm as possible.
77
 The concept of a 
juristic model that is proposed here is meant to be broad enough to capture 
at least the potential objects for reform that Wexler and Winick identify 
and those elements of the law and legal practice over which adversarialism 
has significant control. 
A. Juristic Models, Social Science and Ideology 
One of the reasons that it is difficult to establish which institutions, 
processes, and rules are caught within the ambit of ―the adversarial 
system‖ is that there is such a strong and necessary streak of pragmatism 
in the law. Because of that inherent pragmatism, it is probably not 
surprising that law should be prominent among the disciplines that see 
themselves governed by such a predominantly scientific phenomenon as 
the conceptual paradigm.  
At various stages, lawyers, political theorists, and legal academics have 
sought to equate law with the natural sciences. For example, John Stuart 
Mill asserted that there was such a thing as a ―naturalistic‖ social science 
and that there were causal laws that shaped human society and social 
interactions just as causal laws define the physical world.
78
 Some critics 
suggest that there is such a strong tendency for lawyers and legal 
philosophers to see the law as a given that it assumes the mantle of a 
 
 
 75. See Freiberg, supra note 65, at 221 (discussing the divergent approaches of these courts). 
 76. See DAVID WEXLER & BRUCE WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 3 (1996). 
 77. Id. at 17.  
 78. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC (1930). 
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worldview itself rather than as reflective of some broader worldview. 
Campbell describes this tendency: 
Legal thought seems possessed of characteristics and peculiarities in 
its mode of comprehending reality that distinguish it radically. . . . 
[E]ssentially, in my view, this stems from an acceptance of law as 
given, which results in most subsequent thinking resting on the 
massive assumption that the prescriptions contained in law and laws 
are in some sense descriptions of the actual world. Lawyers 
habitually operate within the framework of the legal system and 
adopt for their own standpoint the interpretations of reality 
contained in the law.
79
  
The legitimacy of extending the paradigm concept to the social sciences 
and beyond can be observed in the long history of scholarship dedicated 
precisely to that objective.
80
 Social scientists have always desired to define 
their disciplines as mature sciences in some sort of revolutionary, 
paradigm shifting phase or crisis, rather than as pre-scientific ideologies.
81
  
One asserted problem with ideologies is that by rendering their 
proponents politically powerful but rationally and instrumentally impotent, 
they can create insurmountable barriers to reasoned and value-guided 
change within a discipline. Because ideologies claim to represent truth, 
their methods, models, and communities focus on the transmission and 
interpretation of unchallenged doctrine.
82
 Kuhn held that science does not 
 
 
 79. Colin Campbell, Legal Thought and Juristic Values, 1 BRIT. J.L. & SOC‘Y 13, 13 (1974) 
(footnotes omitted). The tendency of some jurists to conceive of the law as being a form of objective 
logic has also been long criticized as a mask for more human characteristics. OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES, JR., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465–66 (1897) (―The training of lawyers is 
a training in logic. The processes of analogy, discrimination, and deduction are those in which they are 
most at home. The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic . . . . But certainty 
generally is illusion . . . . Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and 
importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is 
true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding. You can give any conclusion a logical 
form. You always can imply a condition in a contract. But why do you imply it? It is because of some 
belief as to the practice of the community or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in 
short, because of some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative measurement, 
and therefore not capable of founding exact logical conclusions.‖). 
 80. Madan Handa, working in the field of the sociology of education, is usually credited with 
pioneering the development of the concept of the Kuhnian paradigm within the context of social 
sciences. He analogizes the scientific paradigm with what he calls a ―social paradigm‖ and focuses on 
the social circumstances which precipitate a shift in social paradigms. The assertion here is that there is 
precedent for attempting to conceive of a Kuhnian paradigm as being relevant to disciplines outside of 
science. Madan Handa, Address at the International Symposium on Science, Technology and 
Development: Peace Paradigm: Transcending Liberal and Marxian Paradigms (Mar. 20, 1987).  
 81. Both Popper and the early Kuhn agreed they were pre-scientific ideologies. 
 82. KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 1, at 77–79. 
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seek ―true‖ theories looking for an ultimate picture of reality.83 The tests of 
science need to be linked to workability and falsifiability. Therefore, 
scientific conjectures are always tentative in nature. As discussed in the 
previous section, the adversarial paradigm is closely, perhaps 
symbiotically, integrated with traditional liberal ideology and its strong 
focus on individual rights and due process. In much of the literature 
critical of therapeutic jurisprudence, the implication is that, in opposing 
the primacy of adversarialism, advocates for therapeutic jurisprudence are 
taking an anti-liberal stance against individual rights and due process.
84
  
The nature of this criticism is vital. It may well be that the relative 
emphasis placed on the importance of due process, procedural fairness, or 
natural justice forms a deep enough schism between the two models of 
juristic thought to define them as paradigmatic competitors and illustrate 
their incommensurability. In the adversarial system, procedural integrity 
guarantees justice. This is largely achieved by allowing the adversarial 
litigants to define the dispute and the resources used to decide a winner. 
Within a therapeutic paradigm, the court and judge are required to be 
much more interventionist and to modify and customize procedure 
according to the opportunities that arise to address the real substance at the 
heart of disputes or of offending behaviors.  
In an adversarial court, the scope for a judicial officer to address issues 
wider or more fundamental than those dictated by the black letter law, the 
strategic decisions of litigants and lawyers, and the rules of evidence and 
procedure are mostly quite limited. In a therapeutic court, judicial officers 
may well be required to seek out and act on such opportunities. The very 
fact that this would seem anathema to some liberal-minded critics suggests 
that they, as well as many therapeutic jurisprudence practitioners and 
advocates, see the differences as paradigmatic in the Kuhnian sense. 
As for contemporary social scientists, the motivation for wanting to 
perceive the law, or a juristic model, as akin to natural phenomena is the 
desire for certainty among jurists. Certainty of definition, interpretation, 
and application are traditionally the cornerstones of good law making and 
judging.  
To qualify as a paradigm in the Kuhnian sense, a candidate theoretical 
framework need not be linked to a purely empirical discipline.
85
 This is 
 
 
 83. Id. at 146–47. 
 84. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 48, at 2071. 
 85. By empirical I mean either the sense in which a scientific discipline is based on data gleaned 
from observations, experience, or experiment, or the sense in which an empirical discipline or method 
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partly because the rigid and deterministic view of the natural sciences has 
been considerably eroded over the past century. For the purposes of this 
discussion, determinism is the position that every event—including human 
cognition, behavior, decision, and action—is causally determined by an 
unbroken chain of prior occurrences.
86
 A deterministic worldview is one in 
which the physical world is fundamentally shaped and regulated by causal 
laws and relationships which can be observed and measured, leading to 
empirical certainty. This fundamental reliance on a deterministic 
worldview has largely been abandoned in the natural sciences, most 
notably in physics
87
 and biology.
88
 To some extent, it was Kuhn who 
identified and gave a broader theoretical justification for the trend away 
from a deterministic worldview in science by denying that observation, 
experience, and experiment serve as neutral arbiters between competing 
theories. In arguing that paradigms are largely expressions of a consensus 
among practitioners based on factors other than empirical certainty, the 
idea that there are theory-neutral scientific methods has largely been 
discredited. Law is also a fundamentally normative enterprise and any 
attempt to say what the law is or what it ought to be will be primarily a 
normative, not empirical, undertaking.  
It is clearly important to address whether understanding law must 
necessarily collapse into making judgments about the value of the ways in 
which the law currently operates. If we were to grant, however, that we 
cannot make a full and adequate description of the law without taking a 
position as to its worth and value, that ought not to preclude us from 
asserting that the law can be conceived of as conforming to one paradigm 
or another. Indeed, we could interpret Kuhn as taking the view that these 
value judgments about opposing paradigms are what ultimately cause 
them to shift. This is contrary to the more analytical view, championed by 
Karl Popper, that it is empirical falsification, rather than the mindset of the 
practitioners in a discipline, that leads to significant theoretical shifts.
89
 
 
 
is differentiated from one which makes use of deduction from first principles, such as analytical 
philosophy. 
 86. PETER VAN INWAGEN, AN ESSAY ON FREE WILL 55–105 (1983). See also id. at 3 (defining 
determinism as ―the thesis that there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future‖). 
 87. See generally John Earman, Aspects of Determinism in Modern Physics, in PHILOSOPHY OF 
PHYSICS 1369 (Jeremy Butterfield & John Earman eds., 2007) (describing determinism‘s uncertain 
status in physics as somewhere between robustness and fragility); George Ellis, Physics and the Real 
World, PHYSICS TODAY 58 (2005) (describing the inability of laws and theories of physics to predict 
most phenomena in the natural world).  
 88. Edwin Lewis & Ronald MacGregor, On Indeterminism, Chaos, and Small Number Particle 
Systems in the Brain, 5 J. INTEGRATIVE NEUROSCIENCE 223, 223–47 (2006). 
 89. This is not to say that legal theorists have decided one way or the other on this fundamental 
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We could just accept the view, in the vein of Dworkin, that law is a 
profoundly interpretive and social practice with some evaluative 
dimension required by the interpretive process such that any ―theory about 
law‖ must be partly evaluative.90 In fact, it is hard to find any 
contemporary legal theory which purports to be morally neutral. Such 
acceptance does not preclude juristic models from having the qualities of a 
conceptual paradigm and, presumably, some sociologists (in the sense 
attributed to Campbell earlier) would argue that this only strengthens the 
claim. 
In rejecting the need for jurisprudence as a whole to conform to rigid 
determinism, Freedman suggests four reasons why laws of complete 
generality and uniformity are no longer the lynchpin of even the natural 
sciences.
91
 First, the sciences no longer produce inductive inferences of 
absolutely rigid causal laws, but they produce statistical regularities 
assumed to predict what will happen in given situations—once that 
regularity begins to erode, the inferences become suspect. Second, the 
hard sciences now maintain a core belief in the existence of indeterminacy 
or chance at the heart of some physical events.
92
 Third, some hypotheses 
cannot be verified, but this surely does not mean that which is 
hypothesized about cannot exist unless it is verified by direct observation 
or measurement.  
This third component of Freedman‘s argument is quite useful to the 
focus of this Article because it is compatible with the assertion by Popper, 
which Kuhn would not dispute, that theories or laws are always tentative, 
provisional, and liable to possible refutation.
93
 So, despite the fact that the 
 
 
issue. For example, H.L.A. Hart claimed that observers and researchers can articulate laws and 
develop an understanding of law‘s purposes, social functions, and the ways in which it gives reasons 
for action without taking a view as to the moral status of those reasons or purposes. For instance, we 
could tell the complete story of the Nuremberg laws, which prohibited German nationals from 
marrying Jews, without either condemning or advocating any moral rationale for those views in so 
doing. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Peter Cane et al. eds., Oxford University Press 2d. ed. 
1994) (1961).  
 90. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE (1986). 
 91. M.L.A. Freeman, Acquiring Social Knowledge, in LLOYD‘S JURISPRUDENCE 5, 6–7 (2001). 
 92. Typically illustrated by reference to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in quantum 
mechanics, which holds that states that pairs of physical properties, such as position and momentum, 
cannot both be known simultaneously. The more precisely one property is known, the less precisely 
the other can be known. This statement has been interpreted in two different ways and this is not just a 
function of the measuring process or equipment, Ballentine asserted that this is a statement about the 
nature of the system itself as described by the equations of quantum mechanics. Leslie Ballentine, The 
Statistical Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, 42 REV. MOD. PHYS. 358, 358–81 (1970). 
 93. Popper‘s views on the falsifiability requirement are most significantly discussed in The Logic 
of Scientific Discovery. KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1980). I do not suggest 
here that Kuhn subscribes to the role of falsification (which he certainly does not) but just with the 
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adversarial paradigm may be heavily entrenched due to its tested role in 
informing our juristic model for centuries, its component theories and 
methods (if we accept the analogy) are nevertheless tentative and open to 
falsification.  
Finally, Freedman recognizes Kuhn‘s emphasis on the subjective and 
values-based influence of ―normal science,‖ implying that a key reason for 
the continuation of a current paradigm is the state of mind of its 
proponents and advocates. They share an entrenched commitment 
common theoretical beliefs, values, instruments, and methods. 
Freedman tracks a detailed debate in the jurisprudence and social 
science literature about whether law, or even the wider field of the social 
sciences, can be contained within the empiricist account of the natural 
sciences. If it can, then the four assertions above suggest there is no reason 
why any paradigm of law cannot be conceived of as tentative and subject 
to fundamental change. But regardless of whether there is a close enough 
relationship to make that conceptual leap: 
[J]urisprudence . . . is concerned with rule-governed action, with the 
activities of officials such as judges and with the relationship 
between them and the population of a given society. . . . But 
whether jurisprudence is a social science or not, the debates about 
methodology in the social sciences between positivists or 
empiricists and practitioners of hermeneutics are echoed in juristic 
literature.‖94 
It seems to be a tenable position that even if we were unable to classify 
law as a social science, the key methodologies and features of a juristic 
model are analogous enough to those of a social science. Hence, to a 
natural science, that it is a valid and insightful exercise to analyze 
alternative juristic models as if they were Kuhnian paradigms and capable 
of shifting in the Kuhnian sense. This seems to be the unspoken, and 
perhaps intuitive, assumption made by those scholars who have asked 
whether we are currently experiencing a paradigm shift from an 
adversarial to a therapeutic juristic model.
95
 Without a rigorous analysis of 
 
 
position that theories are always liable to change. A very useful comparison and contrast of Kuhn and 
Popper in relation to why scientists ―believe‖ (or claim to know) can be found in FULLER, supra note 
26, at 111. 
 94. Freeman, supra note 91, at 10. 
 95. Freiberg and others actually claim that in a sense the paradigm shift is well advanced. He 
observes that: 
[N]ot only does the criminal justice system overall not function adversarially for the vast 
majority of cases, but that changes in a number of areas have affected the adversarial 
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the nature and content of the competing paradigms, the assumption is 
premature and, to some extent, naive. 
Kuhn held that unlike a normal scientist, a student in the humanities 
disciplines, such as history, ―has constantly before him a number of 
competing and incommensurable solutions to these problems, solutions 
that he must ultimately evaluate for himself.‖96 Once a paradigm shift is 
complete, a scientist cannot then explain a new phenomenon in terms of 
the findings, rules, or accepted facts that were unique to a previous 
paradigm. For example, it would not be open to contemporary pathologists 
to claim that disease was caused by miasma.
97
 But Kuhn argued that a 
person working in the social sciences or humanities can often select from a 
range of theoretical perspectives by which she can interpret or critique the 
findings of others within their discipline. This is somewhat true of the law 
and jurisprudence, which have seen a wide range of critical and theoretical 
perspectives develop.  
Fuller considers this to be a fundamental obstacle to the application of 
the paradigm concept to the social sciences and humanities. He interprets 
Kuhn‘s position in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in the following 
manner: 
Kuhn identified his Eureka moment—when his theory of paradigms 
finally gelled—as occurring when he witnessed the vast difference 
in the way social and physical scientists conduct arguments. No 
matter how much physicists disagree on the value of a particular 
piece of research, they could always agree on an exemplar against 
which to judge it. This was not possible in the social sciences, 
where any candidate exemplar (say, Marx, Durkheim, Keynes, 
Freud, Skinner, or nowadays Foucault would also be a lightning rod 
for fundamental disagreements).
98
 
 
 
paradigm in ways that require a fundamental re-examination of the operation of the courts, of 
the role of judicial officers and lawyers and, significantly, of the way in which lawyers of the 
future are educated.  
Freiberg, supra note 65, at 205.  
 96. KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 1, at 164. 
 97. The miasmatic theory of disease held that diseases such as cholera, Chlamydia, or the Black 
Death were caused by a miasma, a noxious form of ―bad air.‖ Ana Diez-Roux, On Genes, Individuals, 
Society and Epidemiology, 148 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1027, 1027 (1998). Miasma was considered to 
be a poisonous vapor or mist filled with particles from decomposed matter (miasmata) that caused 
illnesses. Id. It was identifiable by its foul smell. This concept was displaced by the germ theory of 
disease, probably as late as 1890.  
 98. FULLER, supra note 26, at 21–22. 
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But as we have already discussed, there is no need to read Kuhn as 
asserting that a paradigm may only be a phenomenon applicable to purely 
empirical discipline. To conceive of all the humanities and the social 
sciences as beholden to a wide range of possible exemplars, depending on 
the views of the individual practitioner, is not to deny that any one of them 
currently operates pursuant to a particular paradigm or disciplinary matrix. 
More particularly, to hold that ―law‖ currently does operate by reference to 
an adversarial paradigm would seem to defuse Fuller‘s simplistic analysis. 
B. Juristic Models as Paradigms 
There have been convincing attempts to provide a theoretical 
justification for extending the notion of a Kuhnian paradigm to include 
juristic thought and, therefore, legal institutions and methods.
99
 Early 
attempts to do this included an explanation of the restorative justice 
approach to juvenile justice processes
100
 and explanation for the resilience 
of concepts of marital property law.
101
 
Campbell has suggested that it is possible to establish the ―inherent 
propriety of applying Kuhn‘s thesis to juristic thought‖102 by arguing at 
two levels: ―Firstly, juristic thought as a realm of knowledge is open to 
similar considerations as scientific thought; secondly, agreement can be 
reached on the question whether juristic thought is at the paradigmatic 
stage or the pre-paradigmatic stage.‖103 
Interestingly, sociologists, such as Campbell, are perhaps both the most 
ardent of the academics in adopting the phenomenon of the Kuhnian 
paradigm shift to their own discipline and in arguing that legal thought—
both in the sense of the judicial and legal reasoning process and in the 
 
 
 99. Of course, there has always been debate about whether law and jurisprudence falls within the 
rubric of the humanities or social sciences at all. This is because the practice of law is largely governed 
by rules which derive their normative force from the authority and sovereignty of their source rather 
than from the doctrinal or theoretical perspectives. There may be an element of intellectual 
isolationism and elitism in Fuller‘s assessment, as well. He claims that, despite the early Kuhn‘s 
dismissal of the social sciences as being explainable by the concept of the paradigm, ―[n]evertheless, 
Kuhn‘s admirers persisted in wrenching Structure from its original context and treating it as an all-
purpose manual for converting one‘s lowly discipline into a full-fledged science.‖ FULLER, supra note 
26, at 22. 
 100. See generally EDWIN LEMERT, THE JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM: SOCIAL ACTION AND LEGAL 
CHANGE (1970). 
 101. See generally Michael Freeman, Towards a Rational Reconstruction of Family Property 
Law, in 25 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 84 (Lord Lloyd of Hampstead & Georg Schwarzenberger eds., 
1972). 
 102. Id. at 15. 
 103. Id. 
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jurisprudential realm—constitutes a Kuhnian paradigm. Some emphasis 
ought to be placed on this given that sociology is the discipline most 
concerned with analyzing and classifying other academic fields and their 
relevant worldviews. Within the field of the sociology of knowledge, a 
number of influential figures have defended the view that juristic thought 
represents a paradigm.
104
 Well before the advent of some of the most 
influential schools of jurisprudence and before the exposure of the myth of 
the declaratory theory of judging, Aubert reached the view that there was 
significant similarity in methods of legal reasoning, modes of legal 
decision making, the construction of legal propositions, shared 
assumptions, and standard methodologies.
105
 Aubert also noted that these 
methods and assumptions were reflected in many schools of jurisprudence. 
He argued that these are all indications of the clear existence of a classic 
disciplinary paradigm.
106
 Campbell concedes
107
 that there are sufficient 
commonalities, from a sociological perspective, between legal thought and 
scientific thought and between juristic activity and scientific activity—to 
accept that law and legal theory operate pursuant to a paradigm, even if 
only for purposes of heuristics or exegesis.
108
 With the benefit of another 
decade of jurisprudence to survey after Aubert, Campbell also 
acknowledged that any number of emerging legal theories could represent 
a new paradigm suggesting changed values, standards, and criteria for 
selecting problem areas for research and for ―accepting the legitimacy of 
solutions.‖109  
A scientific hypothesis, of course, can be disproved by one contrary 
and reproducible observation. But it is not particularly useful to class 
propositions, assertions, and explanations in law as hypotheses. For 
example, we could assert that drug courts are more effective than 
 
 
 104. Vilhelm Aubert, Researches in the Sociology of Law, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 48, 
50–53 (Michael Barkun ed., 1973) (1963).  
 105. Id. at 57–59.  
 106. Vilhelm Aubert, The Structure of Legal Thinking, in LEGAL ESSAYS: A TRIBUTE TO FREDE 
CASTBERG 41 (Johannes Andenaes et al. eds., 1963); see also Campbell, supra note 79, at 15 (―[L]egal 
methods, legal conceptualizations and the underlying theory share an identity or internal coherence 
which has, indeed, remained constant over time.‖) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Aubert‘s conclusion in 
Aubert, supra note 104). 
 107. Id. at 13.  
 108. In terms of heuristics, Campbell means that even if we study law for the purposes of 
uncovering the set of simple and efficient rules which have evolved in the common law jurisdictions to 
try and reduce complex social and legal problems to contests between relatively simple propositions, 
rights and values, a paradigm readily emerges. In terms of exegesis, if we study law to uncover and 
explain the historical and cultural backgrounds and contexts of the authors of law, their texts and 
intended audiences, a paradigm also readily appears.  
 109. Id. at 16.  
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mainstream courts in reducing recidivism rates among drug addicted 
offenders. An observation of one court or jurisdiction where that has not 
been the case for a particular period may be significant in terms of its 
contribution to the overall evaluation of the court, but a single observation 
ought not to drive law or policy. A theory is more resilient than that; a 
theory can be modified. A paradigm, furthermore, will not be as easily 
shifted by anomalies as a hypothesis or a theory. In that sense, a paradigm 
has more work to do than these other, narrower tools.  
Regardless of how widely or narrowly we conceive ―the law‖ to be, 
Campbell concludes that jurisprudence itself is informed by a paradigm at 
any given time: 
[L]egal theory and jurisprudence [do] operate under a particular 
paradigm. This paradigm, derived from the commitments and 
reasoning of practical lawyers, involves a particular ―world view,‖ 
an orientation to practical and pragmatic problem-solving, and set 
methods for tackling these problems. . . . With its focus on the 
pragmatic concerns of decision-making and the perspective of the 
judge in recognising as ―legal‖ certain factual situations and in 
deciding what particular legal meaning to attach to them, legal 
theory adopts a social control standpoint. Its ―exemplars‖ and 
puzzle solutions flow from the judicial process as does its 
methodology in seeking to answer such questions. Commitments 
and stances of this sort go to make up the paradigm—the 
constellation of beliefs, values, [and] techniques that is shared by 
members of the jurisprudential community.
110
 
If we were to grant that they are competing paradigms, then both 
adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence probably share the general 
quality of social control. But they differ in relation to the objectives of that 
control, in what it means to say that a certain fact situation has a ―legal‖ 
status, and in that the puzzle solutions within a therapeutic jurisprudence 
paradigm would subsume, redefine to some extent, and add to those which 
exist under the adversarial paradigm.  
IV. IS ADVERSARIALISM A PARADIGM? 
If juristic models are valid candidates for Kuhnian paradigms, then 
there would appear to be little doubt that ―the adversarial system‖ is a 
 
 
 110. Id. at 22 (footnote omitted). 
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paradigm. It may be the only paradigm that has ever defined the modern 
common law legal world, despite considerable changes in the wider 
disciplinary matrix within which it resides. Academic and judicial writings 
debating whether adversarialism is the best and most efficient method of 
dispensing justice are legion. This does not beg the question as to whether 
adversarialism is the current paradigm—it assumes that it is so. Although 
there are variations
111
 from jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction and from time-to-
time, the assumption is that there exists a core principle, method, and 
belief that defines the model. In the face of the evolution and reform of the 
legal system, there nevertheless remains a minimal skeleton of adversarial 
principles which may not be breached. 
There has been some academic and judicial acknowledgement that the 
principles claimed to comprise the core of the adversarial process are a 
matter of historical and cultural protocol, rather than the product of some 
rational, a priori, mandated design.
112
 To a large extent, it appears that the 
principles of adversarialism are a product of common law convenience and 
are susceptible to paradigmatic change if the judiciary is in favor of 
change. An early assertion that the adversarial core is a product of the 
court system itself comes from Blackstone: 
[I]f therefore the fact be perverted or misrepresented, the law which 
arises from thence will unavoidably be unjust or partial. And, in 
order to prevent this, it is necessary to set right the fact and establish 
the truth contended for, by appealing to some mode of prohibition 
or trial, which the law of the country has ordained for a criterion of 
truth and falsehood.
113
 
According to Underwood, this is an express acknowledgement that the 
civil trial has ―been ordained by the common law‖ itself as the method of 
resolving civil disputes in a court.
114
 Underwood goes on to argue, based 
on observations similar to those of Davies,
115
 that the imperatives which 
 
 
 111. See generally Oscar Chase, American Exceptionalism and Comparative Procedure, 50 
AMER. J. COMP. 277 (2002) (discussing the great variety of adversarial and inquisitorial approaches in 
legal procedure).  
 112. G.L. Davies, The Reality of Civil Justice Reform: Why We Must Abandon the Essential 
Elements of Our System, 12 J. JUD. ADMIN. 155, 157 (2003). 
 113. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, THE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: BOOK III 329 
(Gryphon Editions 1983) (1768).  
 114. Peter Underwood, The Trial Process: Does One Size Fit All?, 15 J. JUD. ADMIN. 165, 166 
(2006).  
 115. Davies, supra note 112, at 157. See also G.L. Davies, Civil Justice Reform: Some Common 
Problems, Some Possible Solutions, 16 J. JUD. ADMIN. 5, 5 (2006) (examining the origins of and 
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historically drove the structure of civil procedure—such as the need for 
oral proceedings, a single climactic trial, and litigation controlled by the 
parties—no longer apply in many cases and that the adversarial core ought 
to be malleable.  
The fundamental statement of the nature of judicial power by the High 
Court of Australia is that it is a power of a sovereign authority to ―decide 
controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, 
where the rights relate to life, liberty or property.‖116 We can perhaps 
glimpse the inalienable adversarial core in that statement: that a court 
exists to decide a controversy. Article III, Section 2 of the United States 
Constitution outlines the jurisdiction of the federal courts of the United 
States with a similarly broad focus on the settling of ―controversies.‖117 
The adversarial paradigm is partly an assumption that those who access 
the courts do so because they are adversaries, and that they will remain 
adversaries for at least so long as their matter continues to be before the 
court. But, in fact, the paradigm expects and requires them to be 
adversaries. The court fundamentally exists to resolve the dispute by 
declaring a winner or coercing the litigants into a settlement, not to change 
those elements of the relationship between the parties that led to the 
dispute.
118
 The pragmatic, but naïve, assumption is that community 
stresses and tensions are reduced primarily by adjudicating the particular 
dispute, not by working on or repairing dysfunctional relationships or 
lives. As discussed above, adversarial trials also serve a symbolic and 
cultural purpose, providing a certain measure of catharsis by the nature of 
the ritual itself. In comparison to inquisitorial systems, for example, the 
adversarial trial, its advocates claim, depends essentially on the emphasis 
on the participation and control of the litigant parties themselves is 
essential.
119
  
 
 
rationales for some key procedural mechanisms of civil trials and arguing that many rationales, 
including that for the reliance on oral testimony, are no longer valid).  
 116. Huddart Parker & Co. Pty Ltd v. Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357 (Austl.). 
 117. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (―The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United 
States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens 
of another State;—between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming 
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
Citizens or Subjects.‖).  
 118. The existence of some restorative, therapeutic, and less adversarial processes and courts--
which are seen as ―specialist‖—underscores the assertion that these deviate from the conceptual and 
legal norm. 
 119. Ellen Sward, Values, Ideology and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 
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Although there are, of course, some courts and tribunals which operate 
in a far less adversarial manner than the trial courts, these fora are defined 
by their deviations from the adversarial norm. We ought also not to define 
adversarialism too narrowly. Requiring or expecting parties to adopt an 
adversarial approach—and for a judge not to intervene beyond what is 
necessary to maintain procedural integrity—does not mean that the 
proceedings need to be overtly conflictual. In many instances, what is 
adversarial about a legal process is that it is up to those seeking and 
resisting remedies to make their cases independently of the adjudicator. 
But there is also little doubt that powerful and influential sections of the 
legal profession and the judiciary view some elements of the adversarial 
process as so intrinsic to their roles as officers of the court that they cannot 
be dispensed with. Then, this commitment to the perceived integrity of the 
system also becomes a source of their power. For example, McEwan 
claims that the formation of a professional bar in eighteenth century 
England led to an emotional commitment by the English Bar to traditional 
adversarial features such as: ―[C]ross-examination, non-disclosure of the 
defense case and the labyrinthine complexities of the rules on the 
admissibility of the defendant‘s criminal record might thus be seen as 
reluctance in the legal profession to let go of its power.‖120 
The language of its critics also bestows upon adversarialism the status 
of paradigm. In Menkel-Meadow‘s wide-ranging critique of the inability 
of adversarialism to retain its relevance in a postmodern world, she points 
to wider academic dissatisfaction with its value. She claims that ―[d]espite 
the longevity and robustness of adversarialism as a mode of human 
discourse, even some philosophers and epistemologists have questioned its 
value as the best way to understand the world.‖121 The choice of the 
descriptor ―mode of human discourse‖ is an interesting one and appears to 
be equivalent to what was posited above as a juristic model in relation to 
the law. Menkel-Meadow points out that there are many other modes of 
 
 
302 (1989) (―[C]urrent ideology extols the adversary system primarily as the best system for 
protecting individual dignity and autonomy . . . .‖). Markus Dirk Dubber provides for a further 
elaboration of the value of autonomy in the adversarial approach. Markus Dirk Dubber, The Criminal 
Trial and the Legitimation of Punishment, in THE TRIAL ON TRIAL VOLUME I: TRUTH AND DUE 
PROCESS 85 (Antony Duff et al. eds., 2004).  
 120. Jenny McEwan, Ritual, Fairness and Truth: The Adversarial and Inquisitorial Models of 
Criminal Trial, in THE TRIAL ON TRIAL VOLUME 1: TRUTH AND DUE PROCESS 62 (Antony Duff et al. 
eds., 2004). 
 121. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, 
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 14 (1996) (footnotes omitted). 
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human discourse, some of which relate to the law and some of which do 
not. Menkel-Meadow position is that: 
[T]he scientific method, for example, which, although it needs to 
―falsify‖ propositions with contrary data, does not set out to prove 
something by juxtaposing its opposite. Additionally, conversation, 
storytelling, mediation, and consciousness-raising are all more 
circular and less structured in method. Dangerous monologic (or 
false adversarial) forms like inquisitions and Star Chambers also 
exist. Finally, there are other, completely different legal systems–
civil, mediational, and bureaucratic systems are examples.
122
 
It is worth noting that tribunals within the common law systems which 
seek to vary or dispense with some core adversarial protections and 
guarantees tend to be created by statutes which include significant 
limitations on how information obtained at the expense of those 
protections can be used. This is evidence that the more a process is seen to 
deviate from the adversarial paradigm, the more oversight and 
accountability is required to limit the potential ―damage‖ suffered as a 
result.
123
 
Justice David Ipp acknowledges that the adversarial system of 
litigation has grown and evolved organically. The system is ―adversarial in 
character, but it has long progressed from the basic classical adversarial 
system where judges are entirely passive. By an ad hoc development of 
rules we now have a hybrid system based on adversarial elements. It 
should be recognised that our system has never been immutable.‖124 
V. IS THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE A PARADIGM? 
If we accept the assertions of Campbell, Aubert, Cotterre, and others 
that juristic thought and legal discourse or practice can constitute distinct 
paradigms in the Kuhnian tradition, then it is reasonable to ask whether 
 
 
 122. Id. at 14 n.38. 
 123. For instance, in Queensland, the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 (Qld) s 190 (Austl.), makes 
it an offense for a person to refuse to answer a question put to them by the presiding officer at a 
Commission hearing. The provision expressly displaces the right to silence and to legal professional 
privilege. Section 197(2) of the Act then provides that ―[t]he answer, document, thing or statement 
given or produced is not admissible in evidence against the individual in any civil, criminal or 
administrative proceeding.‖ Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 (Qld) s 197(2) (Austl.). 
 124. MICHAEL SANDFORD KING ET AL., NON-ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE 11 (2009) (quoting David 
Ipp, Opportunities and Limitations for Change in the Australian Adversary System, in BEYOND THE 
ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM 68, 69 (Helen Stacy & Michael Lavarch eds., 1999) (writing extra-curially 
while Justice David Ipp was a judge of the Supreme Court of Western Australia). 
  
 
 
 
 
132 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 4:97 
 
 
 
 
therapeutic jurisprudence constitutes such a paradigm.
125
 Although I do 
not assert here that therapeutic jurisprudence—at least at this stage of its 
evolution—is, in fact, a paradigm, it is useful to moot it as such for the 
purposes of contrasting the adversarial paradigm with the somewhat 
embryonic, nebulous, and vague delineation we currently have of the 
―post-adversarial‖ paradigm which is prevalent in the literature. With that 
in mind, first consider that a juristic model is something of an abstraction 
itself and does not need to exhaustively explain and reconcile all the 
elements of the legal system. However, the model ought to be able to 
inform each of those processes to the extent that it can provide exemplars 
for the solution of problems, rather than puzzles. Both the extensive body 
of therapeutic jurisprudence literature and the application of therapeutic 
jurisprudence principles in so many legal and judicial practices 
demonstrate that there is significant potential for the movement to provide 
exemplars for many of those processes.
126
 But given that a change of 
paradigm does not change everything within a disciplinary matrix, this 
ought not to be critical.
127
 
One difficulty with affording therapeutic jurisprudence paradigm status 
is the risk of being seen to hold it out as an exclusive and self-contained 
replacement for the core principles which define the adversarial paradigm. 
There has been an apparent, developing reluctance among advocates of the 
various nonadversarial vectors in legal practice and theory to identify and 
name a new legal paradigm. There is even a relatively recent reluctance 
among some advocates to use the term ―paradigm,‖ probably out of a 
misplaced fear that to propose a paradigm shift would suggest that 
adversarial processes have no place in modern law. This, as we have seen 
above, is to misunderstand the nature of a paradigm.  
A more evolved disciplinary matrix retains the core principles of the 
replaced paradigm, but these principles are not necessarily part of the 
defining core of the new paradigm; they may be questioned or breached 
without fear of thereby acting illegitimately or unlawfully. They lose some 
of their normative power and all of their exclusive power to explain. We 
can sense this reluctance and tension in the tendency now to replace the 
term ―nonadversarial‖ with ―postadversarial‖128 and even to replace 
 
 
 125. It is also reasonable to ask whether therapeutic jurisprudence is capable of constituting a 
paradigm.  
 126. It is beyond the scope of this Article to enumerate how each of the posited processes for a 
juristic model relates to various therapeutic jurisprudence initiatives or principles. 
 127. This is, of course, true of other potential paradigms, such as that potentially delineated by 
feminist jurisprudence or Critical Legal Studies. 
 128. Arie Freiberg, Post-Adversarial and Post-Inquisitorial Justice: Transcending Traditional 
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―therapeutic‖ or ―problem solving‖ with ―solutions focused.‖ The latter 
terms seem to implicitly allow for the partial retention of adversarial 
principles and practices as an acknowledgement of their continuing 
legitimacy, while acknowledging the danger of being defined as radical, 
fringe, or transient.
129
 There are those, such as Mark Satin,
130
 who see this 
reluctance as unnecessary and counterintuitive. They argue that the 
reluctance of advocates of the various nonadversarial vectors to explore 
the paradigm-shifting potential of their vectors may result in their 
movements missing the opportunity to significantly reform or to transform 
the legal system. This fear, which resonates in the concerns of Freiberg, 
Rottman, and others, is that therapeutic jurisprudence can only survive as a 
defining core of judicial practice if it is mainstreamed. But even if we are 
to see a paradigm shift in juristic models, the resulting paradigm is almost 
certainly not going to be nonadversarial in the sense that adversarial 
principles and practices have no use. To that extent, the use of the 
descriptor ―postadversarial‖ seems prudent. 
There are at least three justifications for conceiving of therapeutic legal 
thought and practice as potentially conforming to Kuhn‘s model of a 
paradigm. 
First, there is the matter of disciplinary acceptance. A number of key 
researchers, and critics, in the literature do talk about therapeutic 
jurisprudence as a new paradigm—either in and of itself or as a component 
of some wider category such as Comprehensive Law.
131
 A significant 
 
 
Penological Paradigms, 8 EUR. J. CRIM. 82, 98 (2011) (―[T]he theories of therapeutic jurisprudence 
and restorative justice have ameliorated some of the more adverse features of fully fledged 
adversarialism and sought more positive, transformational outcomes for offenders, outcomes that have 
required the more active participation of both offenders and the courts . . . . The broader idea of ‗non-
adversarial justice‘ is still in its infancy and encounters considerable skepticism. ‗Non-‘ or ‗post-
inquisitorialism‘ is likely to suffer the same fate. Both legal systems have strong and long cultural 
traditions that permeate legal education and all branches of the profession. Policy makers are more 
comfortable with known political paradigms and are nervous of system change. Punitive criminal 
justice is culturally and institutionally entrenched.‖) (internal citations omitted).  
 129. Perhaps the experience of other potentially paradigm shifting ―movements‖ such as critical 
legal studies encourages this caution. 
 130. Mark Satin, Healing First: Time for the US Justice System to Get Less Mechanistic and More 
Compassionate, 119 RADICAL MIDDLE NEWSLETTER, Oct./Nov. 2008, http://www.radicalmiddle.com/ 
x_wexler.htm. 
 131. INWAGEN, supra note 86; Earman, supra note 87; Ellis, supra note 87; Michael King, 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Australia: New Directions in Courts, Legal practice, Research and 
Legal Education, 15 J. JUD. ADMIN. 129, 140–41 (2006). Bryant and Faulks examine the extent to 
which the Family Court of Australia, operating pursuant to a policy of less adversarial proceedings, 
operates in a therapeutic paradigm and conclude that those functions of the court are ―consistent with a 
therapeutic paradigm.‖ Bryant & Faulks, supra note 28, at 108. In accusing Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
of breaching the American equivalent of the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers, Hoffman 
characterizes Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a paradigm which threatens the importance of judicial 
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number of law schools include both undergraduate and postgraduate 
studies in therapeutic jurisprudence, Comprehensive Law, and non-
adversarial justice in their curricula. Judicial training in these lenses and 
vectors is relatively common. It is even becoming more common to read 
express reference to therapeutic jurisprudence in the published judgments 
of Australian, American, New Zealand, and Canadian courts and 
tribunals.
132
 
Second, consider that juristic thought obviously does seem to have 
some of the same qualities as scientific and social scientific thought. 
Jurists, legal academics, criminologists, trial lawyers and others make use 
of the scientific method as one means of testing the truth of assumptions 
and hypotheses and of a wide range of methods borrowed from the social 
sciences. Third, and perhaps most importantly, from a Kuhnian 
perspective, we can validly ask whether juristic thought in general is at a 
pre-paradigmatic or paradigmatic stage.
133
 
Despite the fact that some researchers expressly refer to therapeutic 
jurisprudence as a paradigm—and do so to propose it as a clear alternative 
to an adversarial paradigm—advocates, analysts, and critics of therapeutic 
jurisprudence accord it differing status. Some see it as a unique and 
identifiable ―movement,‖ some see it as a lens or vector within a wider 
movement, and others seem to afford it a much narrower ambit. We have 
seen Freiberg and others describe it as an alternative paradigm to 
adversarialism, and we have seen Wexler the need for therapeutic 
jurisprudence practitioners to undertake more macro analytical research. 
Some voices of caution, such as Freckleton, have called for restraint in 
emphasizing the ambit of therapeutic jurisprudence and in treating as it a 
panacea.
134
 
 
 
independence. Morris Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism and Judicial 
Collectivism: The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes the Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
2063, 2088 (2002). 
 132. See, e.g., Fairhall v Sec‘y, Dep‘t of Families, Cmty. Services & Indigenous Affairs [2007] 
1323 AATA (Austl.). See also Marion Collier v Repatriation Comm‘n [2007] 1134 AATA (Austl.); 
Lee v State Parole Auth. of N.S.W [2006] NSWLR 1225 (Austl.); B v Minister for Immigration & 
Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] 173 FLR 360 (Austl.); DPP v. Stone [2003] VSCA 208 
(Austl.). 
 133. Campbell, supra note 79, at 18; Aubert, supra note 104, at 50.  
 134. There are no explicit arguments which would deny therapeutic jurisprudence paradigm status 
in the literature. Most critics are more concerned with pragmatic and legal or constitutional issues 
rather than ontological or epistemic status. However, there is some debate, among therapeutic 
jurisprudence advocates about whether it constitutes a ―theory.‖ Wexler and King are both reticent to 
accord it theory status, perhaps for fear of alienating the profession and the academy by characterising 
it as too ambitious or radical a project. Others, such as Daicoff, Menkel-Meadow, and Horahave no 
doubt that it constitutes a coherent theory which promises much more than a simple vehicle for the use 
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Daicoff has asked whether the various vectors of the Comprehensive 
Law Movement ought to be fully integrated with the legal system or 
whether they ought to be distinct and specialized areas of practice within 
law. Her view is that there ought to be a hybrid response, in that all 
lawyers should be schooled in these vectors (including in therapeutic 
jurisprudence) but that they should then be able to choose whether to work 
in the ―mainstream‖ or in a ―specialized area‖ that emphasizes a vector. 
She concludes that this hybrid approach is the most likely given the 
current level of penetration of these vectors within both law schools and 
within the legal profession. According to Daicoff, ―while the 
integration/specialization question remains open, the hybrid approach 
appears to be most likely, where most lawyers and judges are aware of the 
various comprehensive law vectors, but only a few choose to practice or 
adjudicate in those ways.‖135 However, Daicoff stress that ―most 
importantly, therapeutic jurisprudence and the other comprehensive law 
vectors should be recast as simply ‗best lawyering practices,‘ excellent 
leading advising, or ‗leadership.‘‖136 
Taking a somewhat more cautious approach to the question of 
integration, Freckleton suggests that: 
[I]n the maturation phase of therapeutic jurisprudence those who 
identify its advantages have an intellectual responsibility to be clear 
about the parameters and limits of therapeutic jurisprudence. This 
will reduce its invocation in ways that will bring it into disrepute 
and result in outcomes inconsistent with its values. In addition, with 
its successes comes an obligation to explore what is claimed to be 
its implementation in practice and to evaluate rigorously whether 
such implementation is achieving the desired objectives.
137
 
Although necessary, the mere presence of the therapeutic jurisprudence 
paradigm within the mainstream practice of lawyering and judging is not 
sufficient for a therapeutic jurisprudence transformation of law. Such a 
transformation would require the articulation of arguments and positions 
challenging the core of legal theory and praxis—positions inconsistent 
with the dominant paradigm. According to Kuhn, inconsistency between 
 
 
of social science data to reform particular laws and procedures. Birgden goes farther and would prefer 
to conceive of it as a ―philosophy.‖ Some critics have berated Wexler, as one of the founders of 
therapeutic jurisprudence, for the apparent reluctance to push therapeutic jurisprudence as a 
―reinvention of the law.‖ Satin, supra note 130. 
 135. Daicoff, supra note 67, at 566. 
 136. Id. at 572. 
 137. Freckleton, supra note 70, at 576. 
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dominant and emerging scientific paradigms is one of the sine qua non
138
 
conditions for the accomplishment of scientific revolutions. We need to 
ask whether therapeutic jurisprudence is, in fact, being advanced in this 
way. Is it capturing the legal and scholarly imagination as a potential 
juristic game-changer?  
There is no guarantee that an innovative theory or practice will achieve 
paradigm status. This lack of certainty exists because the fundamental 
requirement for that status the development of a dominant practitioner 
mindset and disciplinary matrix, rather than a set of empirical data or a 
certain level of falsification. Furthermore, to the extent that therapeutic 
jurisprudence challenges the dominant legal paradigm, it is likely to be 
resisted by the mainstream.
139
 The depth of that resistance will afford 
some insight as to its status as a potentially transformative paradigm. 
There is evidence that the main critics of therapeutic jurisprudence do, 
indeed, see it as a force that undermines or challenges some of the most 
fundamental tenets of the common law legal systems. 
To what extent, then, is therapeutic jurisprudence articulating in-depth, 
potentially revolutionizing critiques of law and the legal thought rather 
than simply informing discrete, incremental changes small enough not to 
threaten the ruling adversarial paradigm? Problem solving courts are 
tolerated and generally seen as ―special‖ rather than revolutionary. But the 
status of those practitioners operating according to a new paradigm is also 
important. Even idiosyncrasies of background and personality can play 
influential roles. The status of those proposing the new paradigm can be 
critical to the rate of conversion.
140
 
The claim most commonly made by advocates of a new paradigm is 
that it can resolve the problems that have been intractable under the 
existing paradigm. That tends to be a strongly influential, but not always 
sufficient, claim. Still, this ability to resolve intractable problems is 
 
 
 138. An essential and indispensable condition precedent. 
 139. See Aubert, supra note 104, at 50–53. 
 140. A notorious example of this is that of Lord Rayleigh, John William Strutt, who won a Nobel 
Prize for discovering the inert gas argon. This factual information needs a citation. His name was 
accidentally left off a paper submitted to the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 
1924. Robert Merton, The Matthew Effect in Science, 159 SCIENCE 56, 62 (1968). The editors and 
reviewers rejected the paper, labeling it as ―the work of one of those curious persons called 
paradoxers.‖ Id. (quoting R.J. Strutt, John William Strutt, Third Baron Raleigh (1924)). Once 
Rayleigh‘s name was added, the paper was immediately published. Id. Merton, writing of the 
sociological equivalent, calls this phenomenon ―the Matthew Effect,‖ by which the higher the 
academic or professional status of a person attempting to make an important or unorthodox 
contribution, the less likely it will be listened to. See generally id. at 56–63; Matthew 25:29 (―For to all 
those who have, more will be given, and they will have an abundance; but from those who have 
nothing, even what they have will be taken away.‖). 
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perhaps one of the strongest indicators that therapeutic jurisprudence 
promises to be paradigmatic rather than incremental. There are weaknesses 
and failings of both the civil and criminal law that are perennial, notorious, 
and apparently intractable. Recidivism among criminal offenders and the 
failure of policies and practices of rehabilitation have been particularly 
vexing issues in criminal justice. We must acknowledge, however, the 
successes of a number of problem solving courts in addressing recidivism 
by promoting and managing change in offenders. These successes have 
received significant attention and led to a considerable expansion both in 
the type and number of problem solving courts and in calls for their 
techniques to be mainstreamed.
141
  
Pursuant to the adversarial paradigm, courts have little freedom to 
approach the style of judicial management seen in venues such as the drug 
courts. Compliance with mainstream sentencing law can readily be 
characterized as ―puzzle solving.‖142 A mainstream sentencing court is 
primarily concerned with imposing penalties according to legislative 
sentencing factors. It is not too difficult to conceive of this change in 
approach to drug-addicted offenders as reflective of a change in broader 
worldviews. There has been a clear jurisprudential, legislative, and 
political trend to view some classes of offense as social and public health 
issues rather than as simply legal problems. It is often argued that the drug 
courts themselves are as much a development in public health policy as an 
evolution in court functions.
143
 The adversarial approach has always been 
to view property offenses and offenses of violence committed by those 
 
 
 141. The claims that problem solving courts have the effect of reducing recidivism are sometimes 
questioned or even denied, but there are credible reports in the literature of these successes. See 
generally Nigel Stobbs & Geraldine Mackenzie, supra note 14 (conducting a meta-analysis of the 
relationship of Indigenous sentencing courts to recidivism and attendance rates). As to the proliferation 
of problem solving courts, the latest incarnation seems to be the rise of Gambling Treatment Courts in 
many American jurisdictions. Corey D. Hinshaw, Taking a Gamble: Applying Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence to Compulsive Gambling and Establishing Gambling Treatment Courts, 9 GAMING L. 
REV. 333, 333–34 (2005).  
 142. A sentencing judge in a mainstream court is hardly likely to invite the prosecution, defense 
lawyer and offender to join with the judge as a team in seeking to treat the cause of the offending 
behavior and agree to meet regularly to review progress. Although just that approach is possible 
(especially with enactment of enabling legislation such as the Drug Court Act 2000 (Qld.) (Aust.)) it is 
generally restricted to specifically convened courts. Drug Court Act 2000 (Qld.) s 18 (Aust.), for 
example, provides that a Drug Court Magistrate may make an intensive drug rehabilitation order, and 
that option would not be open to a magistrate in a mainstream Australian court. 
 143. Fleur Beaupert et al., Mental Health Tribunals: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Implications of 
Weighing Fairness, Freedom, Protection and Treatment, 17 J. JUD. ADMIN. 46, 50–52 (2007); Kate 
Diesfeld & Brian McKenna, The Unintended Impact of the Therapeutic Intentions of the New Zealand 
Mental Health Review Tribunal: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives, 14 LAW & MED. 566, 567–
68 (2007). 
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with drug addictions primarily as anti-social behavior which needs to be 
addressed judicially by way of deterrence and punishment. While most 
jurisdictions have long allowed a sentencing judge to include components 
of rehabilitation in a sentence, this sentencing purpose has traditionally 
been drastically under-resourced, arguably pursuant to a more punitive and 
positivist worldview which treats offenders as simplistic and two-
dimensional moral subjects. 
There is certainly a strong Kantian tradition which informs and infects 
the adversarial worldview. Morality, as it concerns transactions between 
rational agents, is at the heart of the doctrine of mens rea, which generally 
holds that a person is morally and legally responsible for her actions so 
long as she knows what it is that she is doing and her choices are 
deliberate. Modern criminological and mental health research shows, of 
course, that the role of rational choice in offending is much less important 
than traditionally believed, and much less so in the case of those whose 
offending is related to pathology, such as those who are drug addicted.
144
 
Evidence of the express acceptance of submissions based on 
therapeutic jurisprudence principles is not hard to find in superior 
mainstream Australian courts. For example, in the New South Wales 
Court of Appeal, the full bench expressly acknowledged the validity of an 
argument appealing the severity of a criminal sentence from therapeutic 
jurisprudence principles. Justice Charles of the Supreme Court of Victoria 
 
 
 144. Rachel A. Hill, Character, Choice, and “Aberrant Behavior”: Aligning Criminal Sentencing 
with Concepts of Moral Blame, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 975, 975–76 (1998); Ray Paternoster & Greg 
Pogarsky, Rational Choice, Agency and Thoughtfully Reflective Decision Making: The Short and 
Long-Term Consequences of Making Good Choices, 25 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIM. 103, 103–07 (2009). 
Notions of human agency are a prominent part of many criminological theories. Rational choice theory 
arose out of the positivist tradition which reduces offending behavior to a set of observable internal 
and external factors and suggests that criminal conduct can be regulated, managed and reduced by, 
inter alia, careful design of the physical environment—such as playing of classical music in shopping 
centers to discourage loitering or improving street lighting to discourage car theft. Contemporary 
theories of critical criminology have long since abandoned the positivist conceptions of crime and, by 
implication, the naïve liberal worldviews which inform it. Being a highly conservative discipline, the 
law appears to be quite slow in keeping abreast of changes in criminological theory and scholarship. 
For example, it would take quite an effort to convince the judiciary and the legislature to consider the 
implications of work in contemporary postmodern philosophy and Lacanian psychoanalysis, as they 
impact modern hybrid criminological theories which seek to explain how the dynamic tension between 
inclusion and exclusion prolongs the narcissistic subject throughout the life-course in an aggressive 
struggle for identities of social distinction expressed by the acquisition and display of consumer 
culture‘s status-symbols. Fining a juvenile for shoplifting on the basis that he is a free moral agent 
living in a liberal world would seem less fraught. CRAIG ANCRUM ET AL., CRIMINAL IDENTITIES AND 
CONSUMER CULTURE 191–217 (2008).  
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(with whom the rest of the bench concurred) acknowledged the force of 
the arguments by counsel of:  
[T]he need to ―break the cycle of recidivism‖ and the dangers of 
institutionalisation. It was submitted that it was within the judge‘s 
sentencing discretion to extend a degree of leniency to Uren to 
maximize the prospect of rehabilitation by attempting to halt the 
process of institutionalisation. Mr Tehan next submitted that the 
judge‘s approach reflected principles developed in the growing 
body of literature dealing with ―therapeutic jurisprudence‖ and 
argued that there is emerging empirical evidence that offenders can 
be rehabilitated where appropriate rehabilitation programmes are 
combined with an approach to sentencing by judges that supports 
rather than undermines the rehabilitation process. He argued that 
modern research suggests that punitive sentencing measures do not 
reduce recidivism. Next, he submitted that even if the Court found 
that there was manifest inadequacy in sentence, the Court retained 
the discretion to decline to interfere with a sentence even though 
manifest inadequacy has been shown.
145
 
So the assertion here is that instances of both academic and judicial 
opinions hold that therapeutic jurisprudence can provide exemplars for the 
resolution of problems which the prevailing adversarial paradigm cannot. 
This is evidence of a disciplinary crisis in the Kuhnian sense. 
Sometimes an argument that the new paradigm is neater, simpler, or 
more streamlined can be influential, even if the new paradigm is only 
marginally better than the former at predicting or explaining. Kuhn 
claimed that the subjective and aesthetic considerations are important. 
Identifying and explaining a paradigm shift while it is in progress is 
usually impossible and it is not until after it has been accepted, tested, and 
applied that the most decisive arguments are developed.
146
 While the shift 
is occurring, opponents claim that the new paradigm is popular because of 
some initial success and that it is really just a novel sort of ―lens‖ with 
which to help diagnose and fix problems within the existing paradigm. 
Given the convoluted and reactive development of the adversarial 
paradigm over several centuries, it is unsurprising that it lacks structural 
and theoretical clarity and precision. Attempts to retain the threads of 
adversarialism in areas which the law is experiencing important and 
 
 
 145. DPP v Stone [2003] VSCA 208 ¶ 18 (Austl.).  
 146. KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 1, at 153. 
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successful evolutionary growth only exacerbate this structural messiness. 
In assessing the inability of the adversarial system to cope with post-
enlightenment worldviews and to make best of use of the enormous body 
of social science data now available to us, Menkel-Meadow suggests that: 
Binary, oppositional presentations of facts in dispute are not the best 
way for us to learn the truth; polarized debate distorts the truth, 
leaves out important information, simplifies complexity, and 
obfuscates rather than clarifies. More significantly some matters . . . 
are not susceptible to a binary (i.e. right/wrong, win/lose) 
conclusion or solution. The inability to reach a binary resolution of 
these disputes may result because in some cases we cannot 
determine the facts. . . . Courts, with what I have called their 
―limited remedial imaginations,‖ may not be the best institutional 
settings for resolving some of the disputes that we continue to put 
before them.
147
 
It is virtually canon in the relevant literature to conceive of and label 
therapeutic jurisprudence as a ―lens.‖ We ought not to confuse different 
conceptions of what a ―lens‖ might be in relation to competing juristic 
paradigms. Daicoff has attempted to identify and explicate what a number 
of alternative approaches to the adversarial practice of law have in 
common.
148
 She analyzes new approaches and emerging paradigms which 
eschew the ―overly adversarial, other-blaming, position-taking‖ tradition 
with which we are all familiar.
149
 Further, she suggests that these new 
―vectors‖150 are all based on the assumptions that: (1) law ought to 
optimize the psychological wellbeing of all those involved in it and (2) 
law ought to be concerned with a wider set of rights than just strict legal 
rights.
151
  
 
 
 147. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 121, at 6 (footnotes omitted). Even if we were not to subscribe 
to the postmodern theoretical perspective from which the author of that paper is obviously arguing, the 
observation is still compelling. 
 148. Law as a Healing Profession: The “Comprehensive Law Movement‖ is Daicoff‘s most recent 
and comprehensive contribution to the field, although she has been analyzing these approaches since at 
least 2000, and she claims that these approaches were merging and synergizing as early as 1997. 
Daicoff, supra note 66, at 1. 
 149. Susan Daicoff, The Comprehensive Law Movement: An Emerging Approach to Legal 
Problems, 49 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 109, 110 (2006) 
 150. Daicoff, supra note 66, at 3 (―The term ‗vectors‘ reflects the forward movement of the 
disciplines into the future and their convergence toward common goals.‖).  
 151. Id. at 1–2. The approaches she identifies as informing the Comprehensive Law Movement 
include: Collaborative Law, Creative Problem Solving, Holistic Justice, Preventive Law, Problem 
Solving Courts, Procedural Justice, Restorative Justice, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and Transformative 
mediation. 
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Daicoff claims that these new approaches represent a new juristic 
paradigm (although she does not use that term) which is an inevitable 
response to what she calls the tripartite crisis in the legal profession: poor 
public confidence in the law, stress and depression amongst lawyers, and 
decreasing professional standards.
152
 The movement is comprehensive in 
that it is interdisciplinary, integrated, humanistic, restorative, and 
therapeutic. Each vector recognizes that it is a function of law to act as an 
agent for positive interpersonal or individual change in some way. Each 
also emphasizes ―rights plus‖ as a legitimate concern of legal processes. 
This consideration of non-legal factors in the resolution of a dispute or 
the administration of justice is antithetical to current practice in law 
schools. Students are required to recognize and disregard factors which do 
not contribute to a legal decision and the ability to do this well generally 
makes a ―good‖ student and ultimately a ―good‖ lawyer or judge. 
Daicoff goes much further in proposing paradigm status for a juristic 
model that includes therapeutic jurisprudence than virtually any other 
contributor to the literature. She claims that the lenses and vectors of the 
Comprehensive Law Movement are all consistent with ―a different 
paradigm for the resolution of legal matters.‖153 She then links the 
assertion of an emergent new legal paradigm to paradigmatic changes in 
wider political and social institutions, mainly by reference and analogy to 
work done by feminist legal academics and researchers of post-
enlightenment developments in law and society. Her analysis in this regard 
is closely linked with the requirement of a changed worldview as a basis 
for a Kuhnian paradigm shift. She makes the quite sanguine claim that a 
reshaped geopolitical world characterized by globalization and a less 
adversarial international political mentality as a result of the end of the 
Cold War ―have contributed to a growing societal awareness of our 
‗connectedness‘ to, and an open mindedness towards, all people, all 
countries, and all cultures in the world.‖154  
This trend among researchers to point to the link between changing 
worldviews and a need for a changed juristic paradigm is quite common. It 
is precisely what would be expected of a discipline that is experiencing an 
increasing number of anomalies, experiencing an increasing inability to 
 
 
 152. Which she says include ―Rambo style litigation‖ and ethically questionable conduct. SUSAN 
DAICOFF, LAWYER, KNOW THYSELF: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF PERSONALITY STRENGTHS 
AND WEAKNESSES 4 (2004). Daicoff is also a psychologist and has written a seminal work on the links 
between the typical lawyer personality and the problems in the profession.  
 153. Daicoff, supra note 66, at 10. 
 154. Id. at 39. 
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solve puzzles in its application, and entering into a period of crisis or 
revolution. The desire of those who resist a paradigm change to justify 
resistance on the basis of incompatibility of alternative paradigms with 
constitutional requirements and due process is surely reflective of a 
rapidly disappearing positivist, and predominantly pragmatist, 
worldview.
155
 It seems that even when the relevant academic literature 
does not explicitly discuss incommensurability, practitioners and other 
stakeholders sense it looming. 
VI. ARE ADVERSARIALISM AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 
COMPETING PARADIGMS?  
Kuhn claimed that paradigm debates are not really concerned with the 
current relative problem solving strengths of each paradigm but more with 
which paradigm is more likely to resolve future problems. In that sense, 
these debates have an element of faith to them.
156
 He says that a 
paradigm‘s success requires some advocates and practitioners who have 
both faith and the ability to apply it and who take the risk of it being 
wrong. Many initial supporters of the paradigm may be attracted to it for 
the wrong reasons.
157
 But the longer it refuses to go away and the more 
critical mass it accumulates, the more likely it is to prevail. A practitioner 
who resists the new paradigm once it has been accepted is not necessarily 
unreasonable or illogical; he simply is not a practitioner of that profession 
anymore. This is, of course, not an implication that practitioners and 
advocates of therapeutic jurisprudence may want to embrace or articulate 
bluntly if they hope to see a paradigm shift. 
The tipping point for a paradigm shift does not necessarily occur when 
a particular amount of evidence or proof has been generated. Acceptance 
and application by a body of stakeholders who are schooled in the new 
 
 
 155. Compare Anthony Mason, Address at the 17th Australasian Institute of Judicial 
Administration Annual Conference: The Future of Adversarial Justice (Aug. 7, 1999) (―[c]ourt 
adjudication in civil cases is essential for the regulation of acts and transactions, in particular for the 
protection of commercial transactions and economic activity. The vitality of commercial life depends 
upon judicial enforcement of contractual rights and obligations . . . .‖), with Freiberg, Non-Adversarial 
Approaches to Criminal Justice, supra note 65, and KING ET AL., supra note 124, at 11–12 ( ―[The 
adversarial system‘s] suitability for a post-modern, multicultural world has been questioned and the 
alternative paradigm of ‗non-adversarial justice‘ represents both a reaction to some of the less 
desirable features of adversarialism and positive contributions from other professions, jurisdictions and 
disciplines to the task of dispute resolution and problem-solving.‖) (internal citations omitted) 
(attributing this idea to Daicoff). 
 156. KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 1, at 160–73.  
 157. See generally Freckleton, supra note 70 (suggesting a list of these potential wrong reasons in 
relation to therapeutic jurisprudence). 
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paradigm is necessary.
158
 Kuhn asserted that the transfer of allegiance 
from one paradigm to another is a ―conversion experience that cannot be 
forced.‖159 Lawyers and judges who have spent long careers working 
within the adversarial paradigm may well resist the assertion that a 
therapeutic paradigm is required—not based on some belief that specialist 
courts do not work but based on the belief that these courts are merely 
variations within the adversarial system such that all problems can be dealt 
with by the adversarial courts.  
As for the current nature of the debate between adherents of 
adversarialism and those proposing a therapeutic jurisprudence approach, 
it is difficult to precisely identify advocates for a strong adversarialism. 
On the surface of the literature, there is almost an absence of debate 
between the two conceptual areas,
160
 but this may well be due to a 
reluctance to be identified too strongly with the more radical element of 
either perspective. There are, of course, those who vigorously criticize 
therapeutic jurisprudence and, in their active resistance of the adoption of 
therapeutic jurisprudence principles, the paradigm debate can be 
identified. Since academics, judges, and practitioners advocating both 
paradigms are intelligent and articulate people, it should be relatively easy 
for members of either group to understand what members of the other 
group are suggesting. Still, the absence of much significant theoretical—as 
opposed to doctrinal—debate in the literature may indicate a lack of 
willingness to engage.  
Therapeutic jurisprudence advocates often seem to publish relatively 
lucid explanations of their core beliefs and hypotheses. However, fairly 
consistent responses designed to stop conversation seem to be that these 
beliefs and hypotheses either are too vague and simplistic or issue blanket 
statements that therapeutic jurisprudence assertions are contrary to due 
process or impermissibly paternalistic.
161
 Conversely, critics of the 
 
 
 158. Max Planck observed that ―[a] new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its 
opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new 
generation grows up that is familiar with it.‖ MAX PLANCK, SCIENTIFIC AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND OTHER 
PAPERS 33–34 (Frank Gaynor trans., 1949). The traction which therapeutic jurisprudence and 
nonadversarial approaches to law is gaining in law school curricula is well documented. See generally 
David Wexler & Bruce Winick,  The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical 
Education: Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605 (2006). 
 159. KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 1, at 151. 
 160. Some advocate for the clear primacy of each paradigm. See generally Satin, supra note 130; 
Mason supra note 161.  
 161. See Bruce A. Arrigo, The Ethics of Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Critical and Theoretical 
Enquiry of Law, Psychology and Crime, 11 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. AND L. 23, 24 (2004); Eric Cohen, 
The Drug Court Revolution: Do We Want Theory Rather than Justice to Become the Basis of Our 
Legal System?, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Dec. 27, 1999, at 20; Hoffman, supra note 48, at 2071; see 
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adversarial paradigm are prone to fixate on certain weaknesses in the 
current system of litigation and conclude that, on the basis of those 
weaknesses, the entire adversarial paradigm is terminal.
162
 Such polarizing 
views are perhaps evidence that we really are dealing with competing 
paradigms, but have not so far led to a productively theoretical discourse. 
A major aim of this Article is to promote and inform such discourse. If we 
grant that a research community—intrinsically linked to a specialist 
profession—consists of the practitioners of a specialty (who are bound 
together by common elements in their education and apprenticeship and 
consider themselves responsible for the pursuit of a set of shared goals), 
communication within that community should not be characterized by 
blinkered misunderstandings and vague generalizations. 
As discussed above, the obvious pragmatic conservatism in the practice 
of law is clearly reflected in the theoretical adversarial paradigm. The 
adversarial system operates pursuant to an often tacit assumption that there 
is a legal solution to every dispute, request for judicial adjudication, or 
determination brought before it. The system cannot be seen as unable to 
deal with any particular fact situation, however novel or intractable it may 
seem. To allow that the law cannot solve a problem which it is expected to 
deal with is to raise the ugly specter of the ―pulling-one-thread argument.‖ 
In such an argument, the anomaly is then reproduced for similar fact 
scenarios where both the core of legal principle, and public confidence in 
the administration of efficient, objective, and infallible justice are 
undermined. The overwhelming focus on rules and the perpetuation of the 
assumption or myth that they are derived from necessary and core 
theoretical principles is both the great strength and weakness of the 
adversarial system. It is a strength in that it promotes certainty and 
confidence; and it is a weakness in that it discourages divergent views or 
critique. An overemphasis on the certainty of outcome, which an 
adversarial trial or hearing is supposed to provide, ignores the aggregating 
 
 
generally David Carson, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Adversarial Injustice: Questioning Limits, 4 
W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 124 (2003); Arthur Christean, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Embracing a 
Tainted Ideal, Sutherland Institute, Sept. 2001, available at http://psychrights.org/articles/Therapeutic 
JurisprudenceTaintedIdeal.htm; Anthony Mason, The Courts as Community Institutions, 9 PUB. L. 
REV. 83 (1998); Mason, supra note 155; Krumholz & Roderick, supra note 39; Christopher Slobogin, 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y & L. 193 (1995).  
 162. Freiberg, supra note 13, at 221; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 121, at 14; Padma Raman, 
Towards a 21st Century Legal System, 76 AUS. L. REFORM COMM‘N 19, 20 (2000); Satin, supra note 
130.  
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body of data which shows that many legal processes and aspirations do not 
work.
163
  
There have been strong words of caution against excessive ―diddling‖ 
with adversarialism at the highest judicial levels, which betray some cross-
jurisdictional tensions. Former Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia 
Sir Anthony Mason asks, for instance, whether a litigation or court system 
which places only secondary emphasis on the process of adjudication 
(either as an option of last resort or just one alternative) can be 
constitutionally valid: 
Have we come so far that we can now say that, in Australia, trials 
are ―a mechanism of valued but last resort‖? Whatever be the 
position in Canada, I do not think that we can make a similar 
statement for Australia. Nor should we. Such a statement seems to 
suggest that court adjudication is simply a back-stop to be invoked 
when all other expedients fail. That suggestion is scarcely consistent 
with the separation of powers and the vesting by the Australian 
Constitution of federal judicial power in Ch III courts. One can 
understand the view that other modes of dispute resolution are 
incidental to the exercise of judicial power, though there are 
difficulties in making good that proposition. But to treat court 
adjudication as if it is something less than the main game, in the 
context of Ch III courts under the Constitution, is to turn 
constitutional tradition on its head.
164
 
Mason again betrays an attitude that a forum or tribunal which does 
something other than adjudicate must be somehow inferior by stating that 
―[c]ourts are courts; they are not general service providers who cater for 
‗clients‘ or ‗customers‘ rather than litigants. And if courts describe 
themselves otherwise than as courts, they run the risk that their ‗clients‘ 
and their ‗customers‘ will regard them . . . as something inferior to a 
court.‖165 
This positing of adversarial trial courts as ultimately the ―main game,‖ 
as constitutionally sacrosanct, and as ―superior‖ to other modes of judicial 
functioning is surely illustrative of the apprehension that the innovations 
of therapeutic jurisprudence are not just tinkering at the edges of law; and 
 
 
 163. Such as the mounting evidence that imprisonment does not rehabilitate offenders or reduce 
recidivism rates, or that the issuing of domestic violence orders does not reduce the incidence of 
family violence, or that increasing penalties does not deter crime. 
 164. Mason, supra note 155 (emphasis added). 
 165. Id. 
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it is an acknowledgement that the paradigm is under threat. As we saw 
above, Kuhn holds that the perceptions of those working within a 
discipline as crucial to the status of a paradigm—at least as crucial as the 
empirical and analytical results of current processes within the paradigm. 
If we were to grant that adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence 
are both paradigmatic jurisprudential models and that they are 
incommensurable, then what is the current state of that 
incommensurability? Is the adversarial paradigm, in fact, in crisis? Or, 
have we perhaps even approached a state of disciplinary revolution in that 
the growing list of anomalies in our legal and judicial systems indicate a 
system which is better described and explained by something other than an 
adversarial core? 
Worldviews change slowly and incrementally, as do disciplinary 
paradigms. The neo-liberal worldview
166
 is pervasive in the political, 
economic, and social life of the Western democracies to the extent that 
some social scientists claim that we have reached ―the end of history.‖ 
Political economist Francis Fukuyama notoriously claims that ―we may be 
witnessing . . . the end of history as such: that is, the end point of 
mankind‘s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western 
liberal democracy as the final form of human government.‖167 
This sort of fundamentalist hubris, which makes explicit claims linking 
a neo-liberal political paradigm with the natural order, obviously appeals 
to the conservative thread in law and jurisprudence. In fact, the very nature 
of a written constitution guarantees that the relationship is reciprocal, that 
is, that law is linked to the liberal worldview in the very coercive fabric of 
the Rule of Law.  
Kagan has examined this link in some analytical depth, studying the 
extent to which an adversarial culture is ingrained in American social and 
political history and claiming that: ―[T]he rhetoric of law is deeply rooted 
in American consciousness, and has been so embedded since the founding 
 
 
 166. The neoliberal worldview can generally be categorized as the idea that material prosperity, 
economic growth, and social wellbeing are best achieved through the actions of individuals pursuing 
their self-interest within freely functioning markets. Interestingly enough, there would seem to be 
some evidence that this neo-liberal paradigm is currently in a state of crisis as a result of the global 
financial crisis of 2009. Governments in the liberal democracies appear much more willing to 
intervene in the markets and to regulate them, in order to try to prevent dysfunction and repair 
fundamental problems rather than to punish individual transgressions by corporations. This might, to 
some extent, be related to the phenomenon of the problem solving courts, where judges are far more 
interventionist and managerial than they would be the case in a mainstream court informed by 
traditional liberal principles, in an attempt to resolve the causes of offending and to identify and repair 
dysfunction. 
 167. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, 16 THE NATIONAL INTEREST 3, 18 (1989). 
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of the country, as captured by John Adam‘s oft quoted description of the 
American polity as a ‗government of law, not of men.‘‖168 
Kagan identifies the roots of adversarial legalism as the formal and 
conservative protocols which make necessary a reliance on adversarial 
legal weapons. This is at the expense of alternatives which may well 
provide a simpler and cheaper alternative. He claims not that the 
prevailing political culture explicitly focuses citizens toward adversarial 
legalism, but that it denies citizens other remedies or mechanisms for 
influence or policy implementation. He asserts that the current political 
culture ―demands comprehensive government protections . . . [while at the 
same time] mistrust[ing] government power [resulting in] fragment[ed] 
political authority [that must be held] accountable through lawsuits and 
judicial review.‖169 This does sound significantly comparable to the style 
of administrative law and of government regulation in many common law 
jurisdictions. The exponential growth of the tribunal system as a means of 
obtaining redress against public authorities is some evidence of this 
increasing reliance on sanctions among regulatory bodies.
170
  
The overall role of the adversarial trial is not just to pick a winner or 
give legal resolution to a dispute. For example, it serves some symbolic 
and cathartic functions, reducing stresses and tensions in a community or 
group through demonstrations and communications of justice being done. 
The important ritual nature of the adversarial trial, based on the relevant 
cultural norms of the particular jurisdiction, is perhaps best reflected in the 
use of juries in Western liberal democracies and common law countries.
171
 
What would be necessary for actual paradigmatic change in terms of 
constitutional principles, law, and legal and judicial ethics is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  
 
 
 168. Herbert M. Kritzer, American Adersarialism, 38 L. & SOC. REV. 349, 349–50 (reviewing 
Robert Kagain‘s book Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law); ROBERT A. KAGAN, 
ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 18 (2001) (using the term legalism to refer to 
the particular style of ―policymaking, policy implementation, and dispute resolution by means of 
lawyer-dominated litigation‖ that is prevalent in the United States). 
 169. Id. at 35. 
 170. There is quite a bit of empirical support for this in Kagan‘s research. He finds that regulatory 
authorities and public interest matters are much more like to be collaborative in the civil law 
jurisdictions than in those with an adversarial system of law evolving from the Westminster system. Id. 
at 35–36. 
 171. Coke suggested that the legitimacy conferred on a trial by the use of a jury was that ―[t]he 
law delighteth herself in the number twelve . . . that number twelve is much respected in Holy Writ, as 
in twelve apostles, twelve stones, twelve tribes.‖ Piyel Haldar, Words with the Shaman: On the 
Sacrifice in Criminal Evidence, in CRIMINAL LEGAL DOCTRINE (Shaun McVeigh et al. eds., 1997) 
(quoting Coke). 
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In order for therapeutic jurisprudence to prosper and to influence the 
wider juristic model, rather than to be limited to what Freiberg earlier 
referred to as ―pragmatic instrumentalism,‖ it needs to be perceived as at 
least informing an alternative and coherent paradigm, regardless of 
whether it is a standalone paradigm. The major theoretical risk of denying 
it such status is that its core messages will be lost.
172
 Legal theory and 
jurisprudential principle arising within the adversarial paradigm take some 
key concepts and principles as so connected to the core of principle that 
they are unassailable, and therefore assumed. If the paradigm itself is left 
unchallenged, then the focus of legal scholars, theorists, and reformers will 
be predominantly on further defining and refining those concepts which 
are taken for granted (such as ―rights,‖ ―property,‖ ―due process,‖ 
―ownership,‖ ―criminal responsibility,‖ etc.). Historically, the most legally 
influential writings of jurists are doctrinal analyses or ―analytical 
jurisprudence.‖ Greater citation of research and writing related to 
therapeutic jurisprudence would be further evidence of an emerging shift. 
It appears that the trappings of adversarialism are being continually 
pared back so that we ought to see manifested in what is left, in the work 
of the courts and in lawyers‘ offices, the absolute core principles which 
have been definitive of the paradigm: they will give us a clue as to when 
the paradigm is actually in flux. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although many academic works use the concept of ―paradigm shift‖ 
and often cite Kuhn as some sort of license for the author‘s revisionism,173 
there is no doubt that the language and conceptual framework of the 
Kuhnian paradigm shift is an invaluable way to conceive of the 
relationship between differing worldviews and methodological 
frameworks within a professional and academic discipline. 
The value of the Kuhnian conception of the paradigm to the therapeutic 
jurisprudence movement is not that it provides any ―algorithm for theory 
choice,‖ but that it greatly assists in framing the extent of the tension 
between two significantly different juristic models. Only if that tension is 
properly framed and contextualized can we then explore the ways in which 
the tension can be resolved. The thrust of this Article is that the tension 
 
 
 172. It may be that some therapeutic jurisprudence advocates are insufficiently aware of this risk. 
 173. Loving and Cobern suggest that this may explain why they frequently found Kuhn cited on 
page one or in the first few paragraphs of a book or article. See generally Cobern & Loving, supra note 
15. 
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constitutes the interplay of two competing paradigms. This means that we 
are unlikely to see some blended model of court system in which some 
courts operate according to purely adversarial principles and some 
according to predominantly therapeutic jurisprudence principles. If, as this 
article posits, therapeutic jurisprudence or some nonadversarial amalgam 
is positioning to replace adversarialism, then some core elements of the 
adversarial paradigm will be replaced. 
So the minimum development we are likely to see in coming years is 
that adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence do not have a common 
language or reference point. For that reason, as Kuhn would suggest, there 
is no point in therapeutic jurisprudence advocates attempting to ―convert‖ 
adversarialists or those with strong ideological objections. If shift is to 
occur, therapeutic jurisprudence will indoctrinate the future generation of 
jurists in its theory and methods. 
Jurists need to recognize that the law is emerging from a very long 
period of normal science and entering a time of crisis. Far from spending 
their time questioning the limits or validity of their paradigm, most 
practitioners during a period of normal science are actually trying to force 
nature to fit their paradigm—and if that were not the case, most of the 
routine functions of the discipline could not occur. 
 
